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For ages, judges and legal academics have claimed that 
federal question jurisdiction has three purposes: to provide liti-
gants with a judge experienced in federal law, to protect litigants 
from state court hostility toward federal claims and to preserve 
uniformity in federal law.  Although one could fill a small library 
with books and articles endorsing this conception of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, one would be hard-pressed to find a single article 
testing these rationales empirically.  
 This Article seeks to be the first such piece of scholarship.  
Based on a study of thousands of state court cases across fifteen 
different states, it first concludes that neither the state hostility nor 
uniformity rationales are borne out by empirical evidence.  Next, it 
explains that federal judges, while likely more experienced than 
state judges in interpreting federal law, have superior experience 
only in certain specific areas of law.  The Article then identifies a 
second purpose that is not often discussed in the context of statu-
tory federal question jurisdiction: the protection of the federal 
governments’ sovereignty interests.  Like federal judicial experi-
ence, however, federal question jurisdiction only protects a spe-
cific type of sovereignty interest—the interest in controlling the 
meaning of sovereign law.  After dismissing the suggestion that 
federal question jurisdiction is necessary to shoulder a large 
caseload, the Article then assesses the implications of the newly-
adduced purposes of the jurisdictional grant by applying them to 
some common jurisdictional dilemmas.    
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court believes that federal question jurisdiction has 
three purposes: (1) to provide litigants with judges more “experience[d]” in 
federal law than state judges, (2) to provide litigants with judges more “so-
licit[ous]” of federal claims than state judges and (3) to promote the “uni-
form[]” interpretation of federal law.1 Just about everybody else seems to 
believe this, too.2 There is a problem with this, however: none of these be-
liefs have ever been verified with empirical evidence.   
 This Article undertakes the first empirical analysis of the purpose of 
statutory federal question jurisdiction.  Relying on a study of thousands of 
state court civil opinions published in fifteen different states, it concludes 
that, while there is empirical evidence that federal judges likely have greater 
experience in some areas of federal law, there is little empirical evidence 
that federal judges will be more solicitous of federal claims or that state 
court adjudication of federal questions—whether at their current level or at 
 
1 Grable & Sons Metal Products Inc. v. Darue Engineering. & Manufacturing Co., 
125 S.Ct. 2363, 2368 (2005). Eight justices joined in this view and no justice dissented. 
Only Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion.  See id. at 2371 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring).  In his short, two-page opinion, Thomas argued that, although the majority reached 
the proper conclusion, it should have relied on a bright-line rule rather than a balancing 
test.  Thomas did not voice, however, any disagreement with the majority’s enunciation of 
the principles of experience, uniformity and solicitude.       
2 See notes 5-25, infra, and accompanying text.   
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a moderately increased level3—leads to greater uniformity in federal law.  
The Article further concludes that federal question jurisdiction also protects 
the federal government’s interest in controlling the meaning of federal law4
but does not shoulder significant caseload burdens.     
 The Article has seven parts.  After this Introduction, Part II summa-
rizes the prevailing beliefs on experience, solicitude and uniformity.  The 
Article then addresses in Part III the uniformity and solicitude rationales 
and finds them either without empirical evidence or strongly contradicted 
by it.  Part IV then adduces empirical evidence confirming the belief that 
the federal judiciary has greater experience than state courts in many, but 
not all, areas of federal law.  This Part also uses empirical evidence to ex-
plain how federal question jurisdiction protects the federal government’s 
sovereignty interest in controlling federal law (but does not protect other 
sovereignty interests, such as the right to appear in sovereign courts).  Part 
V then dismisses an alternative purpose of the jurisdictional grant—that it 
shoulders a large caseload burden that would otherwise fall on the state 
courts.  In Part VI, the empirically justified purposes—experience and sov-
ereign control—are applied to some recurring jurisdictional questions.  Part 
VII then concludes the Article by calling for increased empirical research 
on how federal and state courts interact in practice.      
 
3 To be sure, this Article does not claim that statutory federal question jurisdiction 
could be completely abolished without affecting the uniformity of federal law.  As no one 
deems the repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 even remotely foreseeable, however, such a discus-
sion is generally irrelevant to current decisions in this area.  Nonetheless, because “a cen-
tral task of the law of federal jurisdiction is allocating cases between state and federal 
courts,” and uniformity beliefs apparently play a key role in allocation decisions, it is nec-
essary to assess, as well as possible, how uniformity is or is not maintained through juris-
dictional rules.  Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases 
Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1216 (2004). 
4 While scholars and judges often speak of sovereignty in discussing federal courts’ 
role, Friedman, supra note 3, at 1225; Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the 
Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 BYU L. REV. 67, 80-81, sovereignty is rarely given a role 
in federal question jurisdiction in particular.  Tellingly, the American Law Institute’s land-
mark study of federal jurisdiction—which was authored by some of the most eminent 
scholars in the field—adopted the three-part description noted above and did not address 
any sovereignty concerns.  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURIS-
DICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 164-65 (1969).   
Moreover, even when scholars discuss sovereignty interests in the context of the 
federal courts, they typically fail to distinguish between the different types of sovereignty 
interests—which include controlling sovereign law and having the right to litigate in sover-
eign courts.  This Article recognizes that the distinction is important and should be ac-
counted for in federal question doctrine.     
4 FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION 
II. THE PREVAILING BELIEFS 
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution places within 
the “judicial power” of the federal courts “all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under th[e] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made . . . under their Authority.”5 This grant of judicial power is largely 
implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which employs language nearly identical 
to that used in Article III.6 The primary impact of this statute is to make 
federal courts available to adjudicate federal questions.  This Part explains 
the three purposes scholars and jurists attribute to such jurisdiction: the 
preservation of uniformity in federal law, the provision of a forum hospita-
ble to federal law, and the provision of a judge likely to have experience in 
federal law.7
Before discussing the prevailing beliefs, however, it is important to 
note that § 1331 is just one way that federal courts obtain jurisdiction over 
federal claims.  A number of federal statutes contain their own jurisdictional 
provisions such that, even if § 1331 were removed from the U.S. Code, 
these claims could still be brought in federal court.8 While the current 
scope of federal question jurisdiction is thus a product of § 1331 as well as 
numerous particular jurisdictional grants, it is still possible to speak of fed-
eral question jurisdiction as a coherent whole.  The arguments advanced in 
favor of federal question jurisdiction do not hinge on whether the grant is 
accomplished on a statute-by-statute basis or globally with a single statute.  
Indeed, two of the three beliefs about the need for federal question jurisdic-
tion predate the creation of general federal question jurisdiction by almost a 
century.9 Thus, while this Article often refers to “§ 1331” as a figurehead 
of federal question jurisdiction, one should note that the true federal ques-
 
5 U.S. Const. art 3, § 2.   
6 Section 1331 provides that “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1331.   
7 For clarity’s sake, I present the three purposes separately.  This risks implying that 
some courts and scholars subscribe to some of the three purposes but not all of them as a 
package.  This is not the case.  The three part conception of federal jurisdiction is dominant 
in the judiciary and the academy.  This is perhaps best exemplified by the Supreme Court’s 
most recent pronouncement in Grable, Grable, 125 S.Ct. at 2368, as well as the American 
Law Institute’s statement—written by the top scholars in the field at that point—that the 
jurisdictional grant serves these three goals.  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 4, at 
164-65.   
8 See 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) (permitting civil claimants to sue in federal court);  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (permitting federal courts to adjudicate civil actions “brought under” 
Title VII).  
9 See notes 10 & 13-14 infra, and accompanying text.  
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tion jurisdiction is accomplished by § 1331 and many jurisdictional provi-
sions in other pieces of legislation.   
 
A. Uniformity 
In Federalist No. 80, Alexander Hamilton explained why federal 
courts must be available to adjudicate federal law. “The mere necessity of 
uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws,” he explained, “decides 
the question. Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same 
causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which 
nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.”10 
In the centuries since Hamilton voiced this view, countless jurists11 
and scholars12 have concurred. Moreover, the notion retains its currency 
 
10 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).  
11 Reed v. Farley  512 U.S. 339, 348-49 (1994) (explaining that federal jurisdiction 
is important to creating a “nationally uniform interpretation”); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene 
Tribe of Idaho,  521 U.S. 261, 293 (1997) (stating that federal interpretation of federal law 
is a “means of serving a federal interest in uniformity”);  Tafflin v. Levitt,  493 U.S. 455, 
464 (1990) (noting in the context of exclusive federal jurisdiction that interpretation of fed-
eral law by a limited number of courts promotes the “desirability of uniform interpreta-
tion”);  Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 151 (1988) (White, J. concurring) 
(stating that the “federal interest in uniformity” may require the case be heard in federal 
court); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson  478 U.S. 804, 826 (1986) (Bren-
nan, J. dissenting) (explaining that one of the “reasons Congress found it necessary to add 
[federal question] jurisdiction to the district courts” is “the importance, and even necessity 
of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the 
purview of the constitution”) (quoting Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 347-348 
(1816)) (emphasis in original); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 256 
(1985) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (stating that an “essential function of the federal courts” is 
to “provide a fair and impartial forum for the uniform interpretation and enforcement of the 
supreme law of the land”); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483-84 
(1981) (stating in the context of exclusive federal jurisdiction that “desirability of uniform 
interpretation” is an interest advanced by the jurisdictional grant); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 475, 514 (1973) (stating that the grant of federal jurisdiction was “designed” to   
“achieve greater uniformity of results” (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 
347-48 (1816)); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 541 (1953) (noting in the habeas jurisdic-
tion context that, because the “uniformity of federal law [is] attainable only by a central-
ized source of authority, denial by a state of a claimed federal right must give some access 
to the federal judicial system”);  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 
383 (1996) (explaining that, in the context of exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal 
securities actions, the only extant purpose is “to achieve greater uniformity of construction 
and more effective and expert application of that law.”). 
12 ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.2.1 at 265 (2003) (“Another 
frequently offered justification for federal question jurisdiction is the need to ensure uni-
formity in the interpretation of federal law.”); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 101 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that “prece-
6 FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION 
today.  As noted in the Introduction, the Supreme Court in 2005 continued 
this tradition by stating that § 1331 jurisdiction provides a “hope of uni-
formity” in the interpretation of federal law.      
 
B. Solicitude 
Like the belief in uniformity, the belief that federal courts are more 
solicitous of federal claims than state courts (or conversely that state courts 
are more hostile to federal claims than federal courts) can be traced back to 
Alexander Hamilton.13 Speaking on the issue, Hamilton explained 
 
dential confusion [will be] caused by the dramatic increase in the number of interpreting 
courts”); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 4, at 165 (“The purpose of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction is to promote uniformity in the application of federal law.”) Paul J. Mish-
kin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 157 n.1 (1953) 
(The existence of the federal courts’ is important to “achieving widespread, uniform effec-
tuation of federal law” given that the Supreme Court—the “Constitution’s ultimate expo-
nent of federal rights”—actually decides relatively few cases.); Chemerinsky & Kramer, 
supra note 4, at 83-85 (asserting that federal jurisdiction of some sort is necessary to assure 
the “uniform interpretation and application of federal law”); Friedman, supra note 3, 1241 
(stating that state court adjudication of federal law will create “disuniformity” which is a 
“serious problem[]”); Jeffrey W. Grove, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the 
Twenty-First Century: A Response to Professor Solimine, 35 IND. L. REV. 365, 366 (2002) 
(“In my view, uniformity—or at least an increased potential of uniformity—is a value of 
the first rank.”); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward A Theory Of Interactive Federalism,  91 
IOWA L. REV. 243, 290 (2005); Christopher A. Cotropia, Counterclaims, The Well-Pleaded 
Complaint, And Federal Jurisdiction, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 39 (2004) (stating that one of 
the “the purposes behind federal question jurisdiction” is the “goal of uniformity”); Eric J. 
Segall, Article III As A Grant Of Power: Protective Jurisdiction, Federalism And The Fed-
eral Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 361, 392 (2002) (stating that “federal jurisdiction was always 
intended to be instrumental” and that one of its goals is to “promote the uniformity and 
supremacy of federal law”); Donald Doernberg, There’s No Reason For It; It’s Just Our 
Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Ques-
tion Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (1987) (finding that federal question jurisdiction 
exists in part out of “the need for uniformity in [the] interpretation and application [of fed-
eral law]”); Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost, The Trouble with Federal Question Jurisdiction 
after Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 1477, 1495-96 (1991) (noting that federal question 
jurisdiction provides the “the potential for uniform interpretation of federal law”); Thomas 
B. Marvell, The Rationales for Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examination of 
Student Rights Litigation, 5 WIS. L. REV. 1315, 1335 (1984) (noting uniformity as one of 
three rationales for federal question jurisdiction). 
13 I use the terms “federal solicitude” and “state hostility” interchangeably in this 
Article.  While the Supreme Court often speaks euphemistically of “federal solicitude,” 
scholars tend to more bluntly speak of “state hostility.”  See, e.g., Alan D. Hornstein, Fed-
eralism, Judicial Power and the "Arising Under" Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A 
Hierarchial Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563, 564-65 (1981) (stating that federal question juris-
diction avoids the risk of “state hostility” to federal interests). 
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What, for instance, would avail restrictions on the authority of the 
State legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the 
observance of them? The States, by the plan of the convention, are 
prohibited from doing a variety of things, some of which are incom-
patible with the interests of the Union, and others with the principles 
of good government. The imposition of duties on imported articles, 
and the emission of paper money, are specimens of each kind. No 
man of sense will believe, that such prohibitions would be scrupu-
lously regarded, without some effectual power in the government to 
restrain or correct the infractions of them.14 
This view was echoed in the seminal case on federal question jurisdiction, 
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, where Chief Justice Marshall fielded 
arguments by legal luminaries Daniel Webster and Henry Clay.  Arguing 
that the state law claim at issue in the case “arose under” federal law, the 
two asserted that “the constitution itself supposes that [the state courts] may 
not always be worthy of confidence, where the rights and interests of the 
national government are drawn in question.”15 While Chief Justice Mar-
shall did not overtly cite this position in siding with Webster and Clay, it is 
strongly believed that it figured prominently in the Court’s decision.16 
Since that time, and emboldened by the events of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction,17 the belief in federal solicitude towards federal claims has 
persisted in both judicial18 and academic19 writings and was recently re-
affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2005.20 
14 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).   
15 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 811 (1824). 
16 The role of state hostility is revealed most obviously in Justice Johnson’s dissent 
in Osborn itself. See id. at 871-72 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (stating that the “policy of the 
decision is obvious,” namely to “render[] all the protection necessary, that the general gov-
ernment can give to this Bank”). Years later, Justice Frankfurter made the same observa-
tion.  See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) ("Marshall's holding [in Osborn] was undoubtedly influenced by his fear that 
the bank might suffer hostile treatment in the state courts that could not be remedied by an 
appeal on an isolated federal question."); see also James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, 
Article III Courts, And The Judicial Power Of The United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 
713 n.314 (2004) (“Osborn itself grew out of a perception that federal instrumentalities 
may need protection from hostile state officers and state court judges who would otherwise 
adjudicate common law claims.”). 
17 See Marvell, supra note 12, at 1331-33.  
18 Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 518 (1858) (Taney, C.J.) (stating that “local tri-
bunals [adjudicating federal claims] could hardly be expected to be always free from the 
local influences”); Merrell Dow, 487 U.S. at 826 n.6 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (“Another 
reason Congress conferred original federal-question jurisdiction on the district courts was 
its belief that state courts are hostile to assertions of federal rights.”).  Another clue to the 
“sympathy” purpose behind federal question jurisdiction is the Klu Klux Klan Act of 1871, 
8 FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION 
C. Experience 
While the uniformity and solicitude rationales originated early on in 
the republic, the notion that federal question jurisdiction provides litigants 
with judges experienced in federal law is much newer.  Nonetheless, it is 
just as strongly established as other putative purposes of the jurisdictional 
grant.  In describing the role federal question jurisdiction plays in the na-
tional judicial order, the American Law Institute explained in its Study of 
the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts that “[t]he 
federal courts have acquired a considerable expertness in the interpretation 
and application of federal law.”21 State courts, by contrast, have much less 
expertise because “federal question cases must form a very small part of the 
business of [state] courts.”22 “As a result, the federal courts are compara-
tively more skilled at interpreting and applying federal law, and are much 
 
enacted just four years prior to the general federal question statute.  The Supreme Court has 
twice analyzed the federal jurisdictional provisions of the Klu Klux Klan Act (which is 
more commonly known as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 today) and concluded that a motivating force 
behind the jurisdictional grant was a mistrust of state, as compared to federal, authorities.  
See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240-42 (1972) (“The very purpose of § 1983 was to 
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's 
federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 
whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.”); Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 
457 U.S. 496, 502-07 (1982) (“A major factor motivating the expansion of federal jurisdic-
tion through §§ 1 and 2 of the [Klu Klux Klan Act] was the belief of the 1871 Congress 
that the state authorities had been unable or unwilling to protect the constitutional rights of 
individuals or to punish those who violated these rights.”). 
19 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 4, at 164-65.  (noting the “lack of sym-
pathy” that federal claimants might encounter in state courts); REDISH, supra note 12, at 83 
(stating, in the context of federal question jurisdiction, that “federal judges may often be 
more sympathetic to federal interests than are many state judges”); Mishkin, supra note 12, 
at 158 (noting that federal courts are more likely to give a “sympathetic treatment of  Su-
preme Court precedents” than their “state counterparts”); David Currie, The Federal Courts 
and the American Law Institute, Part I, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1968) (“Because of per-
sistent state-federal hostilities, . . . we do not seem to have reached the point where Su-
preme Court review of state courts is always adequate to assure recognition of federal 
rights.”), Alleva, supra note 12, at 1495-96 (noting that federal question jurisdiction makes 
us of federal courts’ “sympathetic, but respectful, national perspective”); Hornstein, supra 
note 13, at 564 (stating that states may be “provincial[]” with respect to federal rights); 
Marvell, supra note 12, at 1330 (noting that the “reason most commonly cited for both fed-
eral court jurisdiction in article III” is that “federal judges are more likely to uphold federal 
law because they are more sympathetic to federally protected rights than state judges”).  
20 Grable & Sons Metal Products Inc. v. Darue Engineering. & Manufacturing Co., 
125 S.Ct. 2363, 2368 (2005).   
21 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 4, at 164-65 
22 Id.
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more likely correctly to divine Congress’ intent in enacting legislation.”23 
One need not look hard to find numerous courts24 and scholars25 who sub-
scribe to this view. 
 
III. UNIFORMITY AND SOLICITUDE: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Since the time of Alexander Hamilton, federal jurisdiction apolo-
gists have claimed that the jurisdictional grant is necessary to preserve uni-
formity and protect litigants from state hostility. As explained below, how-
ever, these two purposes are unsupported by sufficient empirical evidence. 
 
23 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826 (1986) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
24 Id. at 826-27  (stating that § 1331 provides litigants with a “forum that specializes 
in federal law and that it is therefore more likely to apply that law correctly”); Gulf Off-
shore Co. v. Mobil Oil Co., 453 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1981)  (noting the “expertise of federal 
judges in federal law”); U.S. v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 464 n.11 (1988) (noting that, because 
the Federal Circuit focuses only on a single subject matter, it “brings to the cases before it 
an unusual expertise”); Preiser v. Rodriguez  411 U.S. 475, 514 (1973) (explaining that 
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1331 “to preserve and enhance the expertise of federal 
courts in applying federal law”); Medema v. Medema Builders, Inc.  854 F.2d 210, 
*213 (C.A.7 (Ill.),1988) (noting that exclusive federal jurisdiction “cultivate[s] [federal] 
uniformity and expertise”); Winningham v. U. S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Development  
512 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Federal jurisdiction over actions arising under acts of 
Congress governing the conduct of federal officials [should be decided by federal] tribunals 
which have acquired experience and expertise in dealing with national legislation.”); see 
also S.Rep. No. 1507, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966) (“Additionally, the Federal courts 
have more expertise in deciding questions involving treaties with the Federal Government, 
as well as interpreting the relevant body of Federal law that has developed over the 
years.”). 
25 See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 12, at 2 (“[F]ederal courts have developed a vast 
expertise in dealing with the intricacies of federal law, while the state judiciary has, quite 
naturally, devoted the bulk of its efforts to the evolution and refinement of state law and 
policy. It would be unreasonable to expect state judiciaries to possess a facility equal to that 
of the federal courts in adjudicating federal law.”); Hornstein, supra note 13, at 564-565 
(stating that state court adjudications of federal law carry a higher risk of “error”); Guido 
Calabresi, Federal And State Courts: Restoring A Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1293, 1304 (2003) (“We are federal judges, we have more knowledge of federal law. You 
are state judges, you have more knowledge of state law. Let each of us do our job and not 
be insulted.”); Philip B. Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal 
Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 487 (1960) (“I start with the principle that the 
federal courts are the primary experts on national law just as the state courts are the final 
expositors of the laws of their respective jurisdictions.”); Friedman, supra note 3, 1236-37; 
Alleva, supra note 12, at 1495 (stating that § 1331 takes advantage of federal courts’ “ex-
pertise in discerning and interpreting federal interests”); Marvell, supra note 12, at 1333-34 
(citing numerous sources for the proposition that “federal judges have much more expertise 
in deciding issues involving federal law matters than do state judges”). 
10 FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION 
Moreover, the belief that state court adjudication of federal questions will 
decrease the uniformity of federal law is actually contradicted by significant 
empirical evidence. 
 
A. Uniformity 
The belief that federal question jurisdiction maintains uniformity in 
federal law is based on the supposition that, as the number of decision mak-
ers increases, the variability of final decisions will increase as well.  In 
many respects, this supposition is entirely logical.  For instance, if one 
asked 50 random people on the street to name their “personal hero,” nearly 
50 different answers would likely be generated.   If the same question was 
then posed to 100 people, the variability of responses would almost cer-
tainly increase, resulting in something close to 100 different responses.  
Thus, in this example, as the number of decision makers doubles, the vari-
ability of decisions will likely double (or nearly double).   
Were this the type of question regularly adjudicated in federal 
courts, one could reasonably expect state court adjudication of federal ques-
tions to increase the variability in federal law.  Of course, this question is 
not the stuff of adjudication.  Nor does the way in which respondents de-
termine their answers resemble the methods of legal reasoning employed by 
courts.  As explained below, state court adjudication of federal questions—
at their current or a moderately increased level26—is not likely to increase 
disuniformity in federal law because (1) the nature of many legal questions 
sharply limits the variety of permissible answers, (2) norms of state court 
judging impose meaningful constraints on the variety of answers judges will 
select, and (3) the precedential effect of state federal-law decisions is rela-
tively weak.  Importantly, several or all of these three factors are likely op-
erating at the same time, making it quite unlikely that state court adjudica-
tion—whether at its current or an increased level—significantly affects uni-
formity.  
Before addressing each of these points, however, it is perhaps useful 
to speak more specifically about uniformity in the legal context.  Those ad-
vocating uniformity in the law argue that “federal law should mean the 
 
26 To reiterate the point noted in the Introduction, this Article does not claim that a 
wholesale revocation of federal jurisdiction would not affect the current level of uniformity 
in federal law.  As I explain later in this section, state courts rely significantly on federal 
courts for guidance on federal questions.  Thus, if federal courts were to disappear, state 
courts, initially at least, would be left without any previously valuable guidance on federal 
law.  While it is plausible that, after the initial shock caused by the alteration in jurisdic-
tion, state courts would come rely on each other for leadership, such a hypothesis ventures 
far beyond the support of the empirical evidence adduced in this Article.      
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same thing regardless of the forum.”27 This, however, begs an essential 
question if one is to evaluate legal uniformity in a world of courts and stare 
decisis: how is one to define the “meaning” of federal law?  On one level, 
this is quite simple.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, 
applies only to employers with “fifteen or more employees.”28 If some 
courts held employers with less than fifteen employees liable under Title 
VII, while others only applied the law to employers with fifteen or more 
employees, it could be said that federal law had two different “meanings.” 
Contrast this provision of Title VII, however, with another of its provisions, 
this one making it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any 
[employee] on the basis of . . . sex.”29 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, 
this provision prohibits employers from subjecting employees to a “hostile 
work environment” based on their sex.30 Suppose one court found a work-
place “hostile” under Title VII and another court found a separate work-
place not hostile.  Would this indicate that “hostile” had two different mean-
ings?      
Of course not.  These two examples track the distinction between 
pure questions law and mixed questions of law and fact.  Pure questions of 
law—like the employee numerosity requirement—are directly tied to vari-
ability in law; in fact, under the principle of stare decisis, answers to pure 
legal questions are the law.  Mixed questions of law and fact, however, are 
different.  Such questions are those in which “the historical facts are admit-
ted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the 
facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory standard, or to put it another way, 
whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not vio-
lated.”31 Under this view, because the “rule of law is undisputed” mixed 
questions do not produce new “law.” 
More realistically, however, one must recognize that mixed ques-
tions of law, at some level, do make law.  If one court finds a workplace 
where sexually suggestive pictures of women were publicly posted to be 
“hostile,” while another court finds the posting of such pictures does not 
create a hostile work environment, “hostile” could be said to have two dif-
ferent meanings.  But this example is unrealistic.  Few cases turn on a single 
fact and even when they do, such facts are rarely so generic as to be trans-
ferable to other cases (thereby serving as precedent).  In a hostile work envi-
 
27 Donald L. Beschle, Uniformity in Constitutional Interpretation and Background 
Right to Effective Democratic Governance, 63 IND. L. J. 539, 539 (1988).   
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
30 Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
31 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982). 
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ronment case, for example, a court will likely base its decision on much 
more than the posting of a sexually suggestive picture, and even if it did 
not, other factors (such as the employee’s frequency of exposure) would 
likely be relevant.   
On the other hand, judicial resolution of mixed questions of law are 
often preceded by statements of the applicable law.  Thus, before deciding 
whether a particular workplace is “hostile,” courts often explain in some-
what general terms what “hostile” means.  If different courts explained the 
meaning differently, “hostile” could again be said to have multiple mean-
ings.  In theory, such explanations of the law are mere dicta compared to the 
holding—which is the court’s actual decision and has precedential effect.  
In practice, however, judicial explanations of the law—whether classified as 
holding or dicta—are relied upon by subsequent courts and have effect on 
the meaning of the law.   
Where does this leave us in the study of uniformity?  Ideally, a study 
of state court adjudication of federal law would ascertain the extent to 
which state courts “made” law—either through deciding pure questions of 
law or explaining law prior to deciding mixed questions.  This is easier said 
than done, however.  Classifying even one question as either a pure ques-
tion of law or a mixed question is a notoriously difficult endeavor.32 And to 
classify the many hundreds necessary for a complete empirical study might 
be next to impossible.  Similarly, tracing the impact of hundreds of separate 
state court decisions over time would be highly burdensome, if not impossi-
ble.  Thus, in presenting significant empirical evidence on federal questions 
in state and federal courts, this Article does not distinguish between pure 
and mixed questions of law.  This is unlikely to affect the results presented 
herein, however, because the evidence marshaled on the uniformity issue 
does not hinge on the type of question presented.  Rather, the Article studies 
the nature and methods of adjudication—all of which will apply with equal 
force regardless of whether the federal question is pure or mixed.  With that, 
this section now turns to evidence disproving the uniformity rationale.   
 
32 One court struggling with such issues has referred to mixed questions as “elusive 
abominations.” S & E Contractors. Inc. v. U.S., 433 F.2d 1373, 1378 (Ct. Cl. 1970), rev'd,
406 U.S. 1 (1972).  For an explanation of the complexity in this area, see Evan Tsen Lee, 
Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed 
Questions Conflict, 64 SO. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1991).  For an argument that there is no such 
distinction at all, see Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Dis-
tinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1800 (2003). 
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1. The Nature of Legal Questions 
As suggested at the outset of this section, questions of law differ 
dramatically from other categories of questions.  The difference lies in the 
range of available answers imposed by the question.  The hero question 
posed above—which might be called “open-ended”—imposes virtually no 
constraints on the range of answers.  If the respondent were instead asked to 
name his “currently-living personal hero,” the range of answers would be 
slightly more constrained and the question would thus be somewhat more 
“close-ended.”  On the continuum between open- and close-ended ques-
tions, legal questions lie quite close to the close-ended pole.   
For example, consider the following typical federal question: when a 
school designs an individualized education plan for a student pursuant to the 
Americans with Disability Education Act (ADEA), and the student con-
tends that the plan is insufficient, which party—the student or school—
bears the burden of proving (or disproving) the plan’s compliance with the 
ADEA?33 In deciding this question, it is important to note that a judge will 
not be constrained by the text of the statute, for the statute is silent on the 
issue.  Assume also, for the purposes of this example, that no other piece of 
positive law suggests an answer to the question.  Even here, where the judge 
is free to simply meditate on the metaphysical nature of “burden” or the im-
portance of education in a democratic society, she would still be forced to 
answer the question in one of two ways:  either the student or school bears 
the burden.34 And for that matter, even if a thousand separate judges from 
all walks of life were permitted to meditate on the question, the variability 
in responses would be limited to the same number potentially generated by 
two judges.   
Naturally, the force of this argument depends on the extent to which 
federal questions admit of only a few answers.  While the ADEA question 
described above admits of only two possible answers, other legal questions 
 
33 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2005). 
34 This point is an important one, for it discounts the objections that would likely be 
advanced by adherents to the Legal Realist and Critical Legal Studies movements.  Under 
those schools of thought, text, precedent, and other forms of positive law impose only weak 
constraints on judges.  See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (2d ed. 
1963); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997).  This is undoubtedly true 
in a substantial number of cases.  Yet, because the binary nature of legal questions con-
strains the judge in a way that she cannot avoid, the variability of legal answers will not be 
significantly increased even by judges determined to rule without regard for law.  Put an-
other way, while the Realists and CLS proponents might be correct that judges can manipu-
late positive law to reach their own conclusions, it is not always true that judges can ma-
nipulate the menu of decisions they can reach.   
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might admit of several different answers.  The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, for example, lends itself a plethora of interpreta-
tions.  It becomes necessary, therefore, to assess the incidence of binary or 
multiple interpretations of federal law.  One useful way to assess this is to 
analyze the cases collected in U.S. Law Week’s periodic “Circuit Split 
Roundup.”35 In the “Roundup,” U.S. Law Week lists “cases that acknowl-
edge and describe disagreements in the federal courts of appeals on various 
questions.”36 A review of the splits noted during 1998, 1999, 2002 and 
2003—some 1,017 cases—reveals that the great majority of splits are bi-
nary.   
 
Table 1:  Circuit Splits  
Reported in U.S. Law Week 
Two-way 
Splits 
Three-way 
(or more) 
Splits 
Total Splits 
1998 299 21 320 
1999 265 20 285 
2002 155 20 175 
2003 207 30 237 
Total 926 91 1017 
Percent of 
Total Splits 91% 9% 100% 
As illustrated in Table 1, when federal courts split on the meaning 
of federal law, they almost always split into two camps.  Only 9 percent of 
the time do federal courts split into three or more camps.37 These statistics 
suggest that there is likely an “upper limit” on the variety of interpretations 
of federal law.  Thus, it is improper to assume that state court adjudication 
 
35 The use of U.S. Law Week’s “Circuit Split Round-Up” in this fashion is not new. 
Another commentator, Arthur Hellman (who has studied federal circuit splits in detail for 
the U.S. Government) has relied the resource in an extended study of the subject.  Arthur 
D. Hellman, Never the Same River Twice: The Empirics and Epistemology of Intercircuit 
Conflicts, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 81, 141-42 (2001). 
36 67 U.S. LAW WEEK 2334 (Dec. 8, 1998).   
37 Of course, Table 1 only addresses instances where there is a split on the meaning 
of federal law.  In cases where federal courts are in complete agreement on the meaning of 
federal law even though the law is susceptible to multiple (and reasonable) interpretations, 
state courts might still contribute to disuniformity inasmuch as they opt for one of the rea-
sonable interpretations not chosen by the federal courts.  As explained in Part III.A.2, infra,
this prospect, while possible, is nonetheless generally unlikely.  
JOHN F. PREIS 15
of federal questions will automatically lead to a dramatic increase in disuni-
formity. 
Besides pointing to the binary nature of many federal questions, this 
data is notable for a second reason.  It illustrates the level of uniformity—or 
lack thereof, perhaps—in the federal system on its own.  Over 1,000 dis-
agreements of federal law—which, of course, include only the splits uncov-
ered by U.S. Law Week—is quite significant.  Moreover, one must remem-
ber that these 1,000 decisions include only splits between circuits.  Federal 
district courts publish many times more opinions and no doubt disagree 
with themselves—both within and without the same circuit—on many is-
sues that have not yet yielded published appellate opinions.  These observa-
tions are important because the key issue in assessing uniformity in a world 
of state court adjudication is not whether disuniformity will occur, but 
whether its will occur more often when state courts decide federal ques-
tions.  Given the high rate of disagreement already extant in the federal cir-
cuits, this sets a high bar for those supporting uniformity rationale to clear.   
 
2. Norms of State Court Judging 
Thus far, I have suggested that state court adjudication of federal 
questions is unlikely to dramatically increase variability in federal law be-
cause the nature of legal questions will, to a certain extent, constrain the 
range of available answers.  This point, however, does not foreclose the 
chance that state court adjudication of federal questions might increase vari-
ability in federal law.  For example, it is possible that federal courts, as a 
behavioral matter, tend to align themselves into two camps even though the 
federal question is amendable to more than two interpretations.  In this case, 
it is quite plausible that state courts, not being part of the federal circuit en-
vironment, might opt for a third, fourth, or even fifth interpretation.  Addi-
tionally, it is quite possible that, on issues where federal courts are in com-
plete agreement, state courts might depart from the federal view and create 
variability where there was none before.38 If one studies the norms of state 
 
38 See, e.g., Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990) (re-
jecting the uniform view of the federal circuits on a preemption issue and siding instead 
with a state supreme court decision from another state).  In an insightful paper, Professor 
Donald Zeigler has catalogued the “extraordinary number of different positions” state 
courts take on following federal precedent—including positions such as “slavishly follow” 
and “totally disregard.”  Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Reflections On 
the Standards State Judges Should Use To Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1143, 1153 (1999).  While Professor Zeigler’s paper is a useful compendium of ap-
proaches state courts take, it is not (nor does it purport to be) an empirical analysis of how 
state courts handle federal precedent on the whole.  No doubt, some state courts (like some 
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court judging, however, these inferences are not borne out.  As explained 
below, (1) state courts routinely rely on federal precedent in making their 
decisions, making it likely their decisions will generally comport with those 
of the federal courts, and (2) even when state courts judge in the compara-
tively unconstrained field of state common law, the variability in their re-
sults remains limited quite limited. 
 State reliance on federal precedent. In deciding federal questions, 
state courts appear to rely heavily on federal precedent.39 Evidence of this 
is presented in Table 2, below, which summarizes the results of a study of 
190 randomly-selected state court opinions addressing federal questions.40 
Table 2: State Court Reliance on  
Precedent In Resolving Federal Questions 
Number Percentage
Total cases sampled 190 100 
Total or almost total reliance  
on federal precedent 66 34.7 
Reliance on federal and state precedent  45 23.7 
Total or almost total reliance on state precedent 58 30.5 
No reliance on precedent 21 11.1 
federal courts) often resist binding or persuasive precedent.  This study suggests, however, 
that such behavior is not typical in the courts.   
39 One must recognize at the outset that judges do not always speak truthfully in 
their opinions.  As Larry Solan explained in an insightful book on language and judicial 
opinion-writing, judges face a “temptation to report the reasons behind their decisions less 
than fully and openly” because they must both justify their authority and appear neutral.  
LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGING 2-3 (1993); see also Lauren Robel, The 
Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an 
Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399, 400 (2002) (“Our cultural conception of 
precedent . . . includes shared understandings of the judicial role, which includes the bur-
dens of justification.”).  Admitting incertitude or extralegal motivations, though honest, 
would significantly interfere with the satisfaction of these goals.  If Solan is correct that 
judges write opinions so as to just their authority (which is almost certainly true in at least 
some respects), the citation of federal precedent may be an effort to justify authority rather 
than truthfully explain one’s decision.  While this may be the case in some state cases cit-
ing federal precedent, it would be erroneous to assume that all citations of federal prece-
dent are mere shams.  Thus, while it would be imprudent to rest the entire uniformity 
analysis on this point alone, it is fair to include this among the other factors in this section.   
40 These opinions were sampled from 384 opinions published by state appellate 
courts of mandatory jurisdiction published during 1991 and 2001, which themselves were 
selected from over 4,000 state civil opinions publishing during those same years.  For a full 
description of how these cases were collected, see notes 85-89 and accompanying text, 
infra.
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As this data shows, federal precedent plays a significant role in state court 
resolution of federal questions.  In 58 percent of the cases, state courts re-
lied wholly or partially on federal precedent.  While 58 percent is certainly 
significant, it also means that state courts did not rely on federal precedent 
in nearly 42 percent of the opinions.  While this might give rise to concern, 
a closer analysis of the data refutes this.    
According to the analysis of the circuit splits reported in U.S. Law 
Week, splits occur most often over questions of federal statutes or regula-
tions rather than over constitutional questions. Of the 1017 circuit splits re-
ported in 1998, 1999, 2002 and 2003, 87.4 percent pertained to federal stat-
utes and only 12.6 percent involved constitutional questions.41 Thus, to bet-
ter assess state reliance on federal precedent, one should focus on the cases 
that are typically ripe for disuniformity.    
 
Table 3: State Court Reliance on Precedent  
in Resolving Statutory Federal Questions 
Number Percent-age 
Total statutory federal questions in sample 61 100 
Total or almost total reliance  
on federal precedent 33 54.1 
Reliance on federal and state precedent  13 21.3 
Total or almost total reliance  
on state precedent 8 13.1
No reliance on precedent 7 11.5 
As Table 3 illustrates, state courts rely heavily on federal precedent in re-
solving federal questions based on statutes.  In these cases, state courts rely 
on federal precedent over 75 percent of the time.  Thus, in the most com-
mon field where federal courts split, state courts rely on federal precedent 
exceedingly often.  This, of course, does not guarantee uniformity in these 
cases, but it does suggest that state courts do not take a “free-lance” ap-
proach in deciding federal questions.42 Instead, they appear to search for 
and adhere to federal precedent a significant portion of the time. 
 
41 Specifically, of the 1,017 splits, 128 involved the federal constitution and 889 
involved federal statutes.   
42 It is beyond the scope of this paper to inquire into why state courts rely on federal 
precedent less on civil constitutional questions, but one might guess that they are much 
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State common law decisions. Because “[t]here is no federal  . . . 
common law,” federal questions arising in state courts stem from federal 
statutes or the federal constitution.43 Functionally speaking, the text of stat-
utes or the constitution (as well as precedents interpreting these texts) im-
pose stricter constraints on an interpreting court (whether state or federal) 
than pure common law imposes on a state supreme court.  Thus, in assess-
ing the degree to which state courts might split on interpretations of federal 
law, it is instructive to look to how they split on common law questions.  If, 
given the wide discretion afforded to common law courts, state courts still 
split in a relatively few number of ways, this would suggest that state court 
interpretations of federal law would vary to the same degree (or even to a 
lesser degree) than federal court interpretations.   
To assess the variability of common law between the states, I re-
viewed several hornbooks on three areas of law typically dominated by state 
common law: torts, contracts and property.44 To make the analysis as me-
thodical as possible, I paged through each book from start to finish and 
scanned for places where the authors noted splits of authority.45 While I do 
not contend that this research provides a complete picture of the variability 
of law in these areas, I do think it provides a representative sample of the 
splits. The results are presented in Table 4, below.   
 
more familiar with the analysis of such questions—both because federal constitutional is-
sues arise more often than statutory issues in state courts, see Table 11, infra, and because 
state constitutions often have provisions mirroring federal constitutional provisions.  For an 
insightful study of state constitutional interpretation, see generally JAMES A. GARDNER,
INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYS-
TEM (2005).   
43 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304, U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  This, of course, is a bit of an 
overstatement because, in limited circumstances, federal courts have created federal com-
mon law to protect federal interests.  See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 
363, 366-67 (1943).  While state courts are occasionally called upon to apply (or even cre-
ate) federal common law, see Anthony J. Bellia, State Courts and the Making of Federal 
Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825 (2005), such instances are quite rare relative to the 
instances of statutory and constitutional interpretation.   
44 The hornbooks used were DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS (2000); JOSEPH M. 
PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS (5th ed. 2003); RALPH E. BOYER, ET AL., 
THE LAW OF PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY (4th ed. 1991). 
45 While certain areas of state common law may be more prominent than others in 
terms of the number of adjudications, my goal was simply to discern the frequency of splits 
between states in as methodical a fashion as possible.  Hornbooks, because they typically 
cover a broad spectrum of topics and aim to summarize the law (including majority and 
minority views), seemed the best choice to accomplish this task.  Targeted research on spe-
cific splits between states would always risk the chance that the splits discovered were not 
representative of the whole.       
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Table 4: Variability of Common Law Between 
States in Torts, Contracts and Property46 
Number Percent of total 
Torts – Total splits 51 100.0 
Two-way splits 34 66.7 
Three-way splits 8 15.7 
Four-way splits 6 11.8 
Five-way splits 3 5.9 
Contracts - Total splits 90 100.0 
Two-way splits 69 76.7 
Three-way splits 16 17.8 
Four-way splits 4 4.4 
Five-way splits 1 1.1 
Property – Total splits 67 100.0 
Two-way splits 60 89.6 
Three-way splits 6 9.0 
Four-way splits 1 1.5 
Five-way splits 0 0.0 
Total Splits 208 100.0 
Two-way splits 163 78.4 
Three-way splits 30 14.4 
Four-way splits 11 5.3 
Five-way splits 4 1.9 
As Table 4 illustrates, when state courts disagree on the content of 
traditional common law subjects, only two or three different positions typi-
cally emerge.  Given the plenary discretion state judges enjoy in common 
law decision making, this suggests that some type of behavioral norm is 
likely at work.47 This norm is likely to govern the state courts’ decision 
making in federal questions as well.   
 
3. Precedential Power 
In addition to the close-ended nature of legal questions and state 
court judging norms, state court civil adjudications are unlikely to increase 
 
46 Descriptions of the specific splits and citations to the relevant pages of the horn-
books are on file with the author and available in electronic form upon request.   
47 It is beyond the scope of this Article to prove why state common law rules tend to 
split into only two or three camps.  One could easily hypothesize, however, that the social 
sciences—particularly the field of behavioral economics—has much to say about the sub-
ject.   
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the disuniformity of federal law because they have relatively weak prece-
dential effect.  Significant disuniformity will only flow from decisions hav-
ing significant precedential power.  To be sure, inasmuch as a single deci-
sion differs from the settled view, that decision in itself creates some—
albeit quite small—amount of disuniformity.  But in the federal and state 
systems, where hundreds of thousands of federal questions are decided in 
civil cases each year, a single errant decision by a state trial court does little 
to affect the overall uniformity of federal law.  On the other hand, a single 
decision by a federal circuit court on the same issue may have a significant 
impact on uniformity.  Thus, to assess whether state court adjudications will 
injure the uniformity of federal law, one must assess the impact of state de-
cisions.  In the field of adjudication, a decision’s impact on other courts can 
be measured by citations.48 If a court issues an opinion that is never subse-
quently cited, it is reasonable to conclude the opinion had little effect on the 
law.  To be sure, judges and clerks might read the opinion and apply its rea-
soning without citing it, but this is uncommon, especially given the judicial 
desire to justify the exercise of undemocratic authority.49 
Before presenting the citation data, however, it is important to note 
two prerequisites for even a single citation: an appeal and a published opin-
ion.  First, although trial courts obviously address federal questions in the 
first instance, they rarely, if ever publish their opinions.  Thus, trial court 
adjudications of federal law will, as a practical matter, never have preceden-
tial effect. To develop into precedent, the case must be appealed.  While it is 
difficult to ascertain the civil appeal rate in the state courts, it is likely no 
more than 10.9 percent, which is the rate in the federal system.50 Thus, nine 
 
48 Studying citations to gauge the impact of judicial opinion is not new.  See, e.g., 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and Diversity 
Jurisdiction, 9, J. Legal. Studies 367 (1980) (analyzing citation frequency to assess the 
force of precedent because “the number of citations to a case and the rate at which the case 
depreciates in later opinions appear to provide a reasonable proxies for the precedential 
value of an appellate decision”); Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking Exclusive Federal Juris-
diction, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 383, 415 (1991). James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and 
the Law: Measuring the Importance of Supreme Court Precedents (2006) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=906827 (tracking citations to develop a “network” account of an 
opinion’s precedential import).   
49 See SOLAN, supra note 39, at 2-3 (explaining the judiciary’s desire to justify its 
authority when drafting judicial opinions).   
50 Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further Explora-
tion of Anti-Plaintiff Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 663, 664 tbl.1 (2004) 
(finding the federal civil appeal rate to be 10.9% in cases filed between 1986 and 1997).    
While it is plausible that federal questions involving constitutional rights and certain statu-
tory rights against discrimination might be appealed at a higher rate because of the liti-
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out of ten times, a decision of federal law will not even make it to a court 
that publishes opinions.  If a case reaches that level, however, it is still 
unlikely that it will develop into precedent because state appellate courts 
likely publish no more than 10 percent of their opinions.51 Taken together, 
therefore, the appeal and publication factors suggest that only 1 in 100 fed-
eral questions will even ripen in to precedent that could potentially be cited. 
If a case is fortunate enough to be that 1 in 100, however, the data 
below suggests that there is only a small likelihood that it will serve as 
meaningful precedent.  Presented in Tables 5 and 6, below, are the results of 
a study of 190 state court opinions resolving federal questions.52 Table 5 
contains the citation history for 110 opinions issued in 1991 and Table 6 
contains the citation history for 80 opinions issued in 2001.53 
Table 5: Citations to State Federal-Question  
Opinions Issued in 1991  
Citations Opinions with that number of citations 
Percent of 
total opinions 
0 citations 50 45.5 
1 citation 22 20.0 
2 citations 9 8.2 
3 citations 11 10.0 
4 citations 4 3.6 
5 citations 2 1.8 
gant’s investment in the matter, I have uncovered no empirical evidence that this is the 
case.   
51 While there is little data on state publication rates, I computed a rate of 6.1 percent 
elsewhere in this Article. See note 91, infra, and accompanying text.  While I have no rea-
son to doubt this value, federal court publication rates are commonly thought to be near 20 
percent.  See Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 
177, 189 (1999) (finding that, nationally, 78.9% of appellate decisions went unpublished in 
1995 and 1996 and that, in the Fourth Circuit, that rate was as high as 90.3%); David 
Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1133, 1135, 1146-47 (2002) (“[A]ppellate judges designate for exclusion from the Federal 
Reporter approximately 80% of the opinions they write.”).  In light of the federal rate, and 
for ease of explanation in this case, I assumed a 10 percent publication rate.    
52 Citations were counted using the Westlaw database.  Each of the 190 opinions was 
“Key Cited” to determine the number of opinions that citing to the sample opinion for its 
resolution of a federal question.   
53 These citations were counted in August 2006.  I divided the citation count into 
two tables because, theoretically at least, the number of citations for 1991 opinion should 
be higher than the number of a 2001 opinion at any single point in time.  As some scholars 
have noted, however, precedent “depreciates” in value and, after a certain period of time, is 
no longer cited with regularity. Landes & Posner, supra note 48, at 376-80.    
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6 citations 3 2.7 
7 citations 2 1.8 
8 citations 1 0.9 
9 citations 5 4.5 
10 citations 1 0.9 
Average # of citations per opinion 1.76 
Table 6: Citations to State Federal-Question  
Opinions Issued in 2001  
Citations Opinions with that number of citations 
Percent of 
total opinions 
0 citations 41 51.2 
1 citation 16 20.0 
2 citations 10 12.5 
3 citations 6 7.5 
4 citations 4 5.0 
5 citations 1 1.3 
6 citations 1 1.3 
7 citations 0 0.0 
8 citations 1 1.6 
9 citations 0 0.0 
10 citations 0 0.0 
Average # of citations per opinion 1.11 
Tables 5 and 6 illustrate that the federal questions resolved by state 
courts do not likely have significant impact on the content of federal law.  
Nearly half the opinions, for example, have yet to be cited even once for the 
federal question they resolved.  While some opinions clearly have guided 
other courts, the percentage of opinions with over 5 citations is quite 
small—just 13 percent for the 1991 opinions and 3 percent for the 2001 
opinions.54 Moreover, the average number of citations for both sets of opin-
ions is well below 2.  While certainly not conclusive, this data nonetheless 
suggests that state court opinions resolving federal law do not have strong 
precedential force and are therefore unlikely to significantly injure uniform-
ity.   
* * *
54 Moreover, some citations are not especially indicative of precedential value.  In 
some cases, opinions are cited not to support an argument, but just to note that another 
court has addressed the issue.  In other cases, opinions might be cited for their arguments, 
but with a “but see” signal, indicating that the opinion is not persuasive.   
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A useful way to consider the combined impact of the above empiri-
cal evidence is to consider the chain of events that must occur for state court 
adjudications to decrease the level of uniformity currently extant at the fed-
eral level.  First, the federal question must be amendable to a variety of dif-
ferent interpretations or the federal courts must be in uniform agreement as 
to the meaning of that federal question.  If either of these conditions are sat-
isfied (which, as shown above, is not extremely common), the state court 
must then pay little heed to federal precedent and depart from its usual habit 
of choosing among views currently established in other courts.  If, in the 
minority of cases where this might occur, a state court actually decides a 
question of federal law incorrectly, it must then publish that opinion and 
have it relied upon as precedent for disuniformity to flourish.   Moreover, 
because trial courts very rarely publish opinions, the matter will likely have 
no precedential effect until it proceeds to the appellate level, which only 
occurs in a small fraction of cases.  For disuniformity to emanate from that 
court, of course, it too must ignore federal precedent, depart from other set-
tled views, publish its opinion, and have it relied upon as precedent.  This, 
of course, is unlikely. 
Having addressed the uniformity rationale, this Article now turns to 
the solicitude rationale.           
 
B. Solicitude 
Another belief that animates federal question jurisdiction is the be-
lief that federal courts are likely to be more “solicit[ous]” of federal claims 
than state courts.55 Put differently, this belief contends that federal courts 
somehow care more than state courts about federal claims, or conversely, 
that state courts care less about federal claims.56 Given this understanding, 
 
55 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng. & Mfg., 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2368 
(2005). 
56 While it is tempting to conclude that “solicitude” is simply an alternate expression 
that for the supposed lack of parity between state and federal courts, this conclusion would 
be much too facile.  As is well known in the federal courts field, the parity debate is chiefly 
animated by three issues: technical competence, psychological set, and susceptibility to 
majoritarian pressures.  Given that this conception of the debate includes the issue “techni-
cal competence,” it is clear that any reference to federal “solicitude” should not be under-
stood to generally refer to the alleged lack of parity between the state and federal courts.  
As explained above in Part II, the common beliefs justifying federal question jurisdiction 
include uniformity, solicitude and expertise.  If solicitude referred to parity in general, it 
would render the expertise factor irrelevant.  While this may seem like an overly literal 
reading of recent Supreme Court precedent, the view aligns closely with history.  At the 
outset of the republic, Hamilton defended federal jurisdiction as a necessary protection 
from state hostility.  Of course, as there was no such thing as a federal judge when Hamil-
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the question then becomes: is there any empirical evidence for this?  As ex-
plained below, the answer is no.  Many of the arguments in favor of federal 
solicitude rest on logic rather than hard empirics and the empirical evidence 
that does exist cannot support a jurisdiction-wide presumption of federal 
solicitude.  In this section, I briefly describe the prominence of logic and 
absence of empiricism in the beliefs regarding federal solicitude.  After that, 
I explain in further detail why logic in particular cannot produce a useful 
rule on federal solicitude.       
 
1. The Prominence of Logic 
The notion that federal courts are more solicitous of federal claims 
than state courts stems chiefly from two arguments.57 First, federal judges 
are insulated from “majoritarian pressures” making them freer to rule in fa-
vor of political minorities (who are often advancing constitutional claims).58 
Second, federal judges possess a “psychological set” favoring the enforce-
ment of constitutional rights.59 This Article does not endeavor to test the 
merits of these claims; rather, it simply seeks discern the bases for these be-
liefs.   
 
ton spoke, and no such thing as general federal question jurisdiction until 1875, it is practi-
cally impossible to read expertise into the historical defenses of federal question jurisdic-
tion.  Indeed, it was not until the mid-twentieth century that commentators came to agree 
that “federal courts have acquired a considerable expertness in the interpretation and appli-
cation of federal law, . . . most noticeabl[y] with regard to what are called ‘federal special-
ties,’ . . .  such as bankruptcy and federal antitrust litigation.” AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
supra note 4, at 164-65. 
57 Many prominent scholars base their belief in federal “solicitude” on these argu-
ments.  See, e.g., Martin Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: 
A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 333 
(1988) (noting that an “inescapable logic inference” makes federal courts preferable to state 
courts with respect to civil rights claims); RICHARD A. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CHAL-
LENGE AND REFORM 277 (1996) (stating that “systematically different conditions of em-
ployment” between state and federal judges permit one to infer that federal courts are pref-
erable to state courts in advancing civil rights claims).   
58 This insulation is due to the disparity in job security between state and federal 
judges.  Unlike most state judges, federal judges enjoy life tenure (subject to the unlikely 
prospect of impeachment and removal) and salary guarantees.  For a summary of state ju-
dicial selection methods, see Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting 
Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 273, 314-60 (2002). 
59 This psychological set flows from federal judges’ (1) recognition that they are 
“heirs of a tradition of constitutional enforcement,” (2) greater kinship with the Supreme 
Court and its mission, and (3) “ivory tower” mentality that allows them to recognize the 
primacy of rights without the pressure and emotions attending many state trials.  Burt 
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1124-27 (1977).   
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A cursory analysis of both claims reveals that they are based almost 
exclusively on logical reasoning rather than empirical evidence.  For exam-
ple, the claim that federal courts are more insulated from majoritarian pres-
sures than state courts is based in part on the observation that federal 
judges, unlike most state judges, have life tenure and need never stand for 
election.  As an observation, it is hard to dispute this claim; federal judges 
do have life tenure and state judges are often subject to election.60 But to 
claim that state judiciaries are therefore captive to the electorate—and that 
such captivity affects judicial decision making in civil rights cases—
ventures into the realm of logical inference.61 This is not to say that the in-
ference is wrong per se, of course; it is just to clarify the etiology of the be-
lief.   
Like the “majoritarian pressure” argument, the “psychological set” 
argument is also without empirical support.  While federal judges, on aver-
age, may have common backgrounds and traditions that are distinct from 
those of state judges, there is little empirical evidence confirming this.  
Moreover, even if there were, there is no evidence whatsoever that this 
common mindset translates into solicitude.  This is not to say that judges’ 
psyches have no influence on their decision making (though scholars vigor-
ously dispute the degree of this influence), but simply to point out that there 
is no evidence connecting a common psyche (assuming one even exists) 
with substantive results that could fairly be described as solicitous of federal 
law.     
Thus, the classic arguments for solicitude are, as admitted by one of 
their chief proponents, merely “assumptions” that are not “prove[n] or un-
dermine[d]” by any “empirical studies.”62 
60 This observation was more true at the time Professor Neuborne made it than it is 
today.  See Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 
1491-94 (2005) (noting electoral reforms in state judiciaries).   
61 For instance, this claim rests on a variety of premises which are highly arguable 
and do not ineluctably flow from the central observation.  As Erwin Chemerinsky has ob-
served, this claim “rests, in part, on the assumptions that judicial elections are based on 
evaluations of how judges decide cases; that state court judges recognize this (or fear it) 
and are influenced in their decision-making by future electoral review; and that federal 
judges are not affected by the same public sentiments.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal 
Courts, State Courts, and the Constitution: A Rejoinder to Professor Redish, 36 UCLA L. 
REV. 369, 372 (1988).   
62 Neuborne, supra note 59, at 1116.     
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2. The Impotence of Empirics 
Given the tenuous inferences involved in the traditional arguments 
for federal solicitude, many scholars have explored the issue from an em-
pirical perspective.   Yet, as a distinguished empirical scholar in the field 
recently admitted, “none of the empirical literature on parity is, or purports 
to be, even remotely definitive.”63 To be sure, the studies have provided 
important insights.  Daniel Pinello’s study of federal and state decisions on 
gay rights, for example, forcefully suggests that state courts may in fact be 
more hospitable to gay litigants than federal courts.64 Another scholar in-
vestigated a particular species of takings claims and concluded that judicial 
analyses in state and federal courts “are startling in their similarity.”65 Oth-
ers have compared decisions of appointed and elected judges in state death 
penalty cases and concluded that “selection processes systematically influ-
ence, in the long term, the overall predispositions of those on the bench.”66 
While these and other empirical studies represent important strides 
in the field, they nonetheless fail to advance a comprehensive account of 
federal judicial solicitude (or lack thereof).  Empirical data on cases involv-
ing gay rights, takings, or death penalty cases are not generalizable across 
the entire spectrum of federal questions.  Data on majoritarian pressures in 
death penalty cases, for example, tells us little (if anything) about how state 
and federal judges are likely to adjudicate claims under the Railway Labor 
Act67 or the Telecommunications Act of 1996.68 And even if they did, how-
ever, states undoubtedly differ considerably among themselves with respect 
to their “solicitude” for federal law, making it likely that some states will be 
more solicitous of federal claims than the federal courts, and some states 
 
63 See Solimine, supra note 60, at 1469. 
64 DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 110-17 (2003).  For an-
other empirical study involving gay rights, see William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superi-
ority, 16 CONST. COMM. 599 (1999) (concluding that states may be as or more hospitable to 
gay rights than federal courts).   
65 Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and 
Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 233, 285 (1999).   
66 Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, 
Context, and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, J. POL. 1206, 1207 (1999). 
67 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2005).  Of course, one could hypothesize that state judges 
facing re-election might rule in favor of railroad employees more often than railroads (or, 
depending on importance of campaign contributions, rule in the opposite fashion), but this 
would be an effort at logical deduction rather than empirical observation.   
68 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2005). 
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less solicitous than the federal courts.69 Yet, the rules of federal jurisdiction 
must apply uniformly across the nation.  Thus, the only way to implement 
the empirical project on solicitude is to aggregate the data on all state courts 
with respect to all federal questions and compute a “net” solicitude factor.   
This, of course, is wholly implausible.  Even if it were not, however, there 
can be no doubt that our current empirical knowledge of solicitude falls far 
short of this level and that solicitude is without sufficient empirical evi-
dence permitting it to play a current role in federal question jurisdiction.   
 
3. A Note On the Use of Logic 
Unlike the uniformity rationale—which is contradicted by empirical 
evidence—the solicitude rationale is neither contradicted nor confirmed by 
empirical evidence.  In this situation, one might argue that, in the absence of 
empirical data, it is reasonable, and even appropriate, to rely on logical in-
ferences.  That is, in the absence of concrete evidence that elections exert 
majoritarian pressures on judges, for example, one may nonetheless prop-
erly assume that such pressures somehow affect their decisions.  In this 
sense, logical inferences act as a “second best” method of getting at the 
truth.  It is not the preferred method, but the alternative is simply to throw 
up one’s hands and give up.     
The problem with using logic in this instance mirrors the impotence 
of empirics discussed above.  For example, even if one could rationally in-
fer that elections impose majoritarian pressures on state judges such that 
judges are likely to have less sympathy for federal claims, this inference 
would only hold true for the 39 states that actually use elections to choose 
judges.70 Moreover, even within those 39 states, it is not likely to hold true 
to the same degree.  Some states elect their supreme court judges but ap-
point lower court judges, while other states elect all of their judges.71 Some-
times, the method of choosing judges differs even within a single court.  In 
the Kansas trial courts, for example, the governor appoints some judges 
 
69 For example, in some cases, state courts preceded the federal courts in the devel-
opment of individual rights.  See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts,
S.W. L. J. 951, 956 (1982) (“By the time the United State Supreme Court had imposed [the 
requirement that indigent criminal defendants be represented by counsel], most states ap-
pointed counsel at public expense, as called for by state constitutions, state laws, or state 
practice.  In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court was bringing the few laggards into 
line.”).   
70 Behrens & Silverman, supra note 58, at 314-60 (collecting judicial selection 
methods for each state and the District of Columbia). 
71 Id.
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while the electorate chooses others.72 Not only do states differ in their use 
of elections, but they differ considerably in their election methods. For ex-
ample, some states hold partisan elections while others hold non-partisan 
elections and still others hold retention elections after initial appointments.73 
In light of this picture of state judicial selection methods, one must 
doubt whether a single inference can be safely drawn about majoritarian 
pressures on state judges.  While one might be able to infer pressure or lack 
of pressure for a particular state, the methods of logic do not lend them-
selves to the aggregation of inferences necessary to adopt a single federal 
position on the matter.  Thus, because states differ quite dramatically in the 
factors that allegedly underlie hostility towards federal law, logic is—like 
the current empirical evidence—mostly impotent in informing jurisdictional 
rules.      
 
IV. THE EMPIRICALLY-JUSTIFIED PURPOSES OF § 1331 
 Having explained that there is no empirical basis for claiming that 
federal question jurisdiction maintains the uniformity of federal law or pro-
vides a litigant with a solicitous forum for federal claims, the Article now 
turns to the uses that are empirically justified.  As this Part explains, the ju-
risdictional grant serves two purposes: (1) providing litigants with judges 
who have considerable experience in federal law and (2) protecting the fed-
eral government’s sovereignty interests in controlling the content of federal 
law.   
 
A. Experience 
Federal question jurisdiction allows litigants having civil claims 
based on federal law to bring their claims before courts having substantial 
experience in massive areas of federal law in which state courts have little 
or no experience.74 Note that the experience here is confined to civil cases.  
 
72 Id. at 329. 
73 For a complete summary of state judicial selection methods, see id. at 314-60. 
74 I use the term “experience” deliberately.  While some courts and scholars refer to 
federal judicial “expertise,” experience is a more appropriate term.  The problem with “ex-
pertise” is that it invites confusion with a portion of the parity debate whereby federal 
judges are alleged to have a greater degree of “technical competence”—attributable to their 
supposed heightened intellectual abilities as well as their access to superior law clerks.  
Nueborne, supra note 59, at 1121-24.  As noted above, the differing abilities of state and 
federal courts, if they even exist, is a complex question that many doubt can ever be em-
pirically resolved.  Using the term “experience” rather than “expertise” thus makes it clear 
that the purposes of federal question jurisdiction are not built on the ever-shifting sands of 
the parity debate. 
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Because this Article explores the purposes of federal question jurisdiction 
(which obtains only over civil cases), it makes sense to study the civil cases 
adjudicated in state and federal courts.  While state criminal prosecutions 
often involve federal questions (typically based on the Fourth, Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments), these cases are not cognizable in federal courts and 
there is virtually uniform agreement that such cases should not be litigated 
in federal court.75 Thus, the appropriate universe of cases to consider in an 
analysis of federal question jurisdiction is limited to civil cases.76 
At first glance, it might seem like state courts would have significant 
experience applying federal law in civil cases.  Under various interpreta-
tions of § 1331 or other judge-made doctrines, federal questions appear in 
state civil proceedings on a somewhat routine basis.  For instance, because 
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over most 
federal issues, parties may choose to litigate their federal disputes there.77 
Or, where the only federal question in a case arises as a defense, the parties 
are obliged to rely on state courts to resolve their claims.78 Similarly, if a 
federal question on the face of complaint is not “substantial,” a federal court 
 
75 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 3, at 1241 (sovereign law should be litigated in 
sovereign courts).  Of course, scholars have debated the Supreme Court’s ruling in Younger 
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), that state criminal defendants may not challenge on-going 
state court prosecutions in federal courts. See, e.g., Martin Redish, Abstention, Separation 
of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984) (arguing that 
judicial abstention violates separation of powers); Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is 
Wrong about Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097 (1985) (disagreeing with Professor Redish); 
Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Juris-
diction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990) (arguing that abstention doctrine is the product of a 
“dialogic process of congressional enactment and judicial response”).  Yet a suit of this 
type would amount to a collateral federal action that could not alternately be filed in state 
court.  It therefore differs greatly from the typical civil case involving a federal question 
where the claimant may chose to file in either state or federal court.     
76 While state habeas proceedings as well as certain parole hearings are often 
couched as civil actions, I excluded such cases from the state cases surveyed because, al-
though they are civil in nature and may involve federal questions, they could not be filed in 
federal court under federal question jurisdiction.  This is so not because federal question 
jurisdiction excludes such cases, but because the Court has concluded they are cognizable 
only under the federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction.  Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 
(1994). 
77 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947 (holding that state courts must adjudicate 
federal questions if they have “jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established lo-
cal law to adjudicate” the federal question); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) 
(“[W]e have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus pre-
sumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the Untied States.”).   
78 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); see also 
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (“A defense that raises a 
federal question is inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction.”). 
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may not assert jurisdiction under § 1331 and the parties must litigate the 
matter in state court.79 In still other cases, even where a substantial federal 
question is plead on the face of the complaint, a federal court may still 
choose to abstain from hearing the matter thereby relegating the parties to 
state court.80 Based on these doctrines, many scholars have long presumed 
that state courts decide significant numbers of federal questions in civil 
cases.81 
Despite this presumption, there is a complete dearth of data on what 
federal questions state courts actually decide.  To my knowledge, no indi-
vidual or organization has ever made an effort to catalog the number and 
nature of federal questions that state courts routinely decide.82 To begin to 
fill this gap in the scholarship, I reviewed the published opinions issued by 
the appellate courts of 15 states during 1991 and 2001.83 Although much 
more research must be done, it is clear from the research thus far that state 
courts decide a relatively modest number of civil cases involving federal 
questions.  Moreover, the federal questions state courts do decide are con-
 
79 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng. & Mfg., 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2368 
(2005) (holding that federal question jurisdiction does not obtain unless a federal question 
is “substantial” such that a “federal forum may entertain [the question] without disturbing 
any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”) 
80 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1971) (holding that a federal court must 
abstain from adjudicating claims involved in a currently-pending criminal proceeding); 
Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar. Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (extending 
Younger; holding that a federal court may not adjudicate federal issues involved in a cur-
rently-pending civil enforcement proceeding); Buford v Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) 
(holding that a federal court should permanently abstain from hearing federal claims in-
volving unclear law and complex state regulatory frameworks).  
81 See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum, 339 U.S. 667, 673 (1950) (Frank-
furter, J.) (noting that abrogating the well-pleaded complaint rule would cause the federal 
courts to be overrun with a “vast current of litigation”);  Mishkin, supra note 12, at 162 
(stating that, granting federal courts “virtually the full constitutional range of jurisdiction 
over federal questions might well flood the national courts, thereby deflecting them from 
their real functions”).   
82 To my knowledge, only three studies have addressed this issue, though all of them 
were narrow in scope.  Two studies have focused only on federal questions adjudicated in 
state supreme courts and a third study, while more comprehensive in terms of courts, only 
focused on § 1983 actions.  See Daniel J. Meador, Federal Law in State Supreme Courts, 3
CONST. COMM. 347 (1986) (studying federal questions decided in the supreme courts of 7 
states); National Center for the State Courts, Comparison of Federal Legal Influences on 
State Supreme Court Decisions in 1959 and 1979 (1981) (researching federal law adjudi-
cated in four state supreme courts by counting citations to federal cases); Solimine, supra 
note 48, at 413-19 (researching § 1983 claims decided in state courts).       
83 The states were Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wyoming.   
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fined to a rather slim category of cases.84 This suggests that state courts 
have much less experience than federal courts in a variety of federal ques-
tions and therefore that federal question jurisdiction offers litigants a forum 
with judges likely to be much more experienced than state courts in federal 
law.  
 Before presenting the results of this study, it is necessary to explain 
the study’s methodology.  First, the universe of state cases studied were 
opinions published in West’s Pacific85 reporter during 1991 and 2001 by 
courts of mandatory jurisdiction.86 To determine which cases in that uni-
verse potentially involved federal questions, I used the Westlaw database to 
identify cases in this reporter (decided during 1991 or 2001) that contained 
the term “U.S.C.A.”87 Anytime a state court refers to a federal statute or the 
federal constitution—regardless of how the court cites the provision or even 
if the court fails to cite the provision88—West inserts a citation containing 
“U.S.C.A.” into the “Headnote” dealing with that portion of the opinion.  
After obtaining a list of cases containing the term “U.S.C.A.,” I then read 
the cases to determine which ones actually involved the resolution of a fed-
eral question.  This was necessary because, in many instances, state courts 
cited federal law not as part of any analysis of a federal question, but simply 
 
84 I recognize, of course, that state courts decide many questions (both state and fed-
eral) that are not memorialized in a published opinion.  This fact is unlikely to affect the 
conclusions reached in this paper because the conclusions rely on percentages rather than 
aggregate numbers of cases.  As long as the publication rate is roughly similar among fed-
eral question and non-federal question cases (and there is no reason to believe it would 
significantly differ), the percentages are likely to be trustworthy.   
85 I chose to focus on West’s Pacific reporter because it covers the same states as 
those within the Ninth and Tenth Circuits of the federal system.  This allows one to make 
greater use of federal court statistics, which are often grouped by circuit.   
86 In most states, courts of mandatory jurisdiction—i.e., courts that must hear cases 
properly within their subject matter jurisdiction—are trial and intermediate appellate 
courts.  Some states, however, do not have intermediate appellate courts and rely on their 
supreme courts to handle appeals.  These courts, although typically called “supreme 
courts,” are nonetheless courts of mandatory jurisdiction.  The states in this study without 
intermediate appellate courts are Montana, Nevada and Wyoming.          
87 Additionally, during most of the 1990s, West published an index at the beginning 
of each volume listing the cases reported within that volume that cited federal law of any 
type.  At some point, West stopped publishing this index and the only way to discern which 
state cases potentially involve federal law is to search the Westlaw database for the term 
“U.S.C.A.” 
88 For instance, if a state court deals summarily with an equal protection claim under 
the federal constitution and does not cite to the federal constitution, West would still insert 
“U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14” into the Headnote dealing with that portion of the case.   
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as background or as part of a tangential statement.89 While reading the 
cases, I noted the federal law that the court interpreted as well as the Head-
note under which the decision appeared.  The product of this process, there-
fore, was a list of all federal questions decided by state courts of mandatory 
jurisdiction in civil cases during 1991 and 2001.   
Turning to the results of the study, one notices immediately that, on 
the whole, state courts do not decide huge numbers of civil federal ques-
tions.  Among the civil opinions published by the appellate courts of man-
datory jurisdiction in the 15 states of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, federal 
questions arose in roughly 10% of the civil opinions published in 1991 and 
2001.90 
89 For example, many states sanction attorneys for committing criminal acts.  In issu-
ing a disciplinary opinion dealing with an attorney who has violated a federal wire fraud 
statute, for example, the state court will often cite the federal wire fraud statute as predicate 
to sanctioning the attorney.  Although the state court cited federal law, it did not resolve 
any federal question.  See, e.g., People v. DeRose, 35 P.3d 708 (Colo. 2001). 
90 I calculated the total number of published civil opinions from courts of mandatory 
jurisdiction in two steps.  First, I searched the Westlaw “allstates” database for all pub-
lished civil opinions during 1991 for the 15 states covered in the Pacific reporter.  To do 
this, I constructed a search that would retrieve every published opinion (1) having an 
“P.2d” in its citation, (2) issued during 1991 by a lower court (3) but that did not have any 
criminal law “topic numbers” listed in any Headnotes, (4) did not have any references to a 
“table” or “memorandum” opinion, and (5) did not contain the words “not reported”—
which often indicate an unpublished opinion.  (Table or memorandum opinions are typi-
cally opinions listing cases that have been denied or granted certiorari, or listing cases that 
have otherwise received a summary disposition.)  For this example, the specific Westlaw 
search instructions were:   
ci(“p.2d”) & da(aft 12/31/1990 & bef 1/1/1992) & co(low) % to(110 197 203 349 
350H) ci(table) ci(mem!) ci(“not reported”) 
I then repeated this search using the year 2001. 
 Second, because the first search only focused on lower court opinions (due to the 
“co(low)” search term), I then searched specific jurisdictions without intermediate appel-
late courts for the same type of cases.  To collect such cases from the jurisdiction of Mon-
tana, for example, I searched the “mt-cs” database using the following search terms: 
ci(“p.2d”) & da(aft 12/31/1990 & bef 1/1/1992) % to(110 197 203 349 350H) 
ci(table) ci(mem!) ci(“not reported”) 
The only difference between this search and the one noted above is the absence of 
“co(low).”  After retrieving cases from the states without intermediate appellate courts 
(which, in the Pacific reporter, include Montana, Wyoming and Nevada), I added these 
cases to the total cases retrieved in the first search.   
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Table 7: State Civil Opinions: Federal vs. Non-Federal  
Questions in States of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits  
1991 2001 
Total % Total % 
Total civil opinions published by ap-
pellate courts of mandatory jurisdic-
tion 
2,290 100 1,712 100 
Civil opinions published by appellate 
courts of mandatory jurisdiction re-
solving a federal question 
219 9.6 165 9.6 
While this quantity of federal questions appears rather insignificant, it re-
veals little standing alone.  Instead, it must be compared to the number of 
federal questions heard in federal appellate courts.  Moreover—because the 
goal here is to assess experience, which is a trait of individual judges rather 
than courts—one must compare the federal questions resolved per appellate 
judge. This comparison is presented in Table 8, below.  
 
Table 8: Federal Questions Decided Per Judge  
In State And Federal Appellate Courts in 2001 
State Federal  
Estimated federal questions resolved 
in civil cases by state appellate courts 
of mandatory jurisdiction91 
2705 4,729 
91 To meaningfully compare state and federal court adjudications of federal law, it is 
necessary to choose a single metric—total published opinions or total resolved cases.  On 
the state level, the only feasible way to count the number of state court adjudications is to 
use West’s Pacific reporter—which, by definition, contains published opinions.  These 
results are published in Table 7.  On the federal level, the only feasible way to count fed-
eral court adjudications is to use the statistics kept by the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts—which list total recorded cases.  (Theoretically, one could page through the Fed-
eral Reporters to count cases, but this would be an excessively onerous task and is not fea-
sible without a substantial research team.)  In light of this divergence, I elected to convert 
the state published opinions to total resolved cases by multiplying the number of published 
opinions by the publication rate of 6.1%.   
 I calculated this rate by dividing the number of opinions published by intermediate 
appellate courts during 2001 in 12 states West’s Pacific reporter by the number of cases 
disposed of by the same courts during 2001.  According to Westlaw the intermediate appel-
late courts in Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Utah and Washington published 2,223 opinions during 2001.  (I left the state su-
preme courts of Montana, Wyoming and Nevada out of this calculation because, although 
courts of mandatory jurisdiction, their publication rates are likely to be different due to 
their status as supreme courts.) According to a report by the National Center for State 
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Number of appellate judges on court 24392 6093 
Federal questions resolved  
per appellate judge 11.1 78.8 
Thus, according to Table 8, the average federal appellate judge has seven 
times more experience with federal questions that the average state appel-
late judge.  Yet, appellate experience is not an especially useful metric for 
comparing state and federal courts.  In both the state and federal systems, 
trial judges have the final say in the great majority of cases.  Thus, a truer 
picture of experience—that is, one experienced by most litigants—must fo-
cus on the experience of trial judges.   
 This is easier said than done, however.  Because state trial courts 
rarely, if ever, publish opinions, the only way to estimate the number of 
federal questions adjudicated in trial courts is to use appeal rates.  Yet, 
while there is reliable data on federal appeal rates,94 there is no such data on 
state appeal rates.  This is perhaps due to the wide variety of specialized 
courts in state systems, many of which appeal to differing intermediate ap-
pellate or supreme courts.95 This makes it quite difficult to arrive at any 
 
Courts, these same courts disposed of 36,618 cases during 2001. Brian J Ostrum, et al., 
Examining the Work of State Courts, 2002: A National Perspective from the Court Statis-
tics Project, Table 2 (2003) available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/CSP_ 
Main_Page.html.  This yields a publication rate of 6.1%. 
Notably, this number differs somewhat significantly from federal publication rates 
of roughly 20 percent.  See note 51, supra. If the state publication rate were actually higher 
than 6.1 percent, the number of federal questions likely resolved in state appellate courts 
would actually be significantly lower.  For example, if the rate were 20 percent instead of 
6.1 percent, the number of federal questions adjudicated in state courts would be only 825 
rather than 2,705.   
92 Ostrum, et al., supra note 91, at 8-59. 
93 Surprisingly, the most reliable way to count the number of federal judges at spe-
cific point in time is consult a volume of West’s Federal Reporter containing cases from 
that point in time.  This number, which includes both active and senior circuit judges, was 
calculated using volume 240 of the Federal Reporter, Third, pages xii-xiii.  The number 
includes both active and senior circuit court judges, but does not include the periodic par-
ticipation of visiting judges in the cases.    
94 See Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 663, 664 tbl.1 (finding the federal civil appeal 
rate to be 10.9% in cases filed between 1986 and 1997).   
95 For example, many states have a variety of limited subject matters courts—such 
as municipal courts, juvenile courts, family law courts, probate courts, water courts etc—
which may appeal to several different courts, which in turn may themselves appeal to dif-
ferent courts.  See Ostrum, et al., supra note 91, at 3-59 (containing charts of court struc-
tures for each state and the District of Columbia).  Federal questions may arise in any of 
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single appeal rate for the state system.  Thus, to compare trial court experi-
ence, it is necessary to assume a variety of different state court appeal rates.  
In Table 9, federal questions in state trial courts are calculated using a con-
servative, moderate and liberal appeal rate and the federal questions per trial 
judge are then calculated.96 
Table 9: Federal Questions Decided Per Judge  
In State And Federal Trial Courts in 2001 
State Federal  
Estimated federal ques-
tions resolved in trial 
courts 
27,050 (at 10% appeal rate) 
54,100 (at 5% appeal rate) 
270,500 (at 1% appeal rate) 
43,38597 
# of judges on trial courts 2,86598 19399 
Federal questions resolved 
per trial judge 
9.4 (at 10% appeal rate) 
18.9 (at 5% appeal rate) 
 94.4 (at 1% appeal rate) 
224.8 
Even under the most conservative appeal rate of 1%, federal trial judges still 
adjudicate more than two times the number of the civil federal questions 
than state courts.  If the appeal rate is a more plausible 5%, however, federal 
judicial experience exceeds that of states judiciaries’ by a factor of 12.  And 
 
these courts, but are certainly more likely to appear in courts of general jurisdiction.  Thus, 
it is difficult if not impossible to calculate a single, representative appeal rate.      
96 I chose these appeals rates based on the evidence of appeal rates in both state and 
federal courts.  In state courts, the only available data on appeal rates places the rate at 
0.7%.  James P. George, Access to Justice, Costs and Legal Aid, 54 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 
293, 298-99 (2006) (placing the appeal rate at 0.7% after excluding traffic court cases).  At 
the federal level, appeal rates in civil cases have repeatedly been placed near 10%.  See 
Eisenberg, supra note 50, at 663, 664 tbl.1.  Using these two rates as end points, I chose 5% 
as a mid-point appeal rate.     
97 This number was calculated using a 10.9% appeal rate.  See Eisenberg, supra note 
50, at 664 tbl.1. 
98 See Ostrum, et al., supra note 91, at 8-59.  In counting the judges on the state trial 
courts, I counted only judges in courts of general jurisdiction.  Many state courts have 
courts of limited jurisdiction (such as small claims, family or probate courts) in which fed-
eral questions might conceivably appear.  Nonetheless, significant numbers of federal ques-
tions are unlikely to appear in these types of cases and, to compare state court and federal 
experience in the most conservative manner, I excluded these from the total.  If these 
judges were added to the total state judge count, state inexperience with federal law would 
be even more pronounced.   
99 These judges were counted by referring to the list of judges published in 2001 in 
volume 142 of the Federal Supplement, Second, pages vii-xxiv.  
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if the state appeal rate turns out to be at or near 10%, federal experience 
with civil federal questions would be nearly 24 times state court experience.    
 One must be careful, however, not to ignore the law of diminishing 
returns with respect to experience.  That is, while federal trial judges might 
hear 2 times the number of civil federal questions as state trial judges (as-
suming the conservative appeal rate of 1%), state trial judges might still de-
velop significant experience in federal law from those adjudications.  After 
all, adjudicating 94 cases each year is likely to have an educational effect on 
state judges.  The difficulty with this hypothesis, however, is that there are 
tens of thousands of different federal laws (whether enacted as a constitu-
tional provision, statute, regulation, or some other form).  State trial judges 
might indeed gain significant experience in a federal law if they addressed 
the same provision 94 times each year, but they might gain very little ex-
perience if they adjudicate a particular federal question no more than once 
every couple years. The only way to properly assess state trial judge experi-
ence, therefore, is to consider the incidence of particular federal questions 
adjudicated in state courts.  As Table 10 makes clear, the majority of federal 
questions resolved in state civil opinions are constitutional questions.   
 
Table 10: State Civil Opinions Resolving Federal  
Questions: Statutory v. Constitutional Questions 
1991 2001 
Total % Total % 
Civil opinions resolving federal  
question(s) 219 100 165 100 
Civil opinions resolving only  
statutory federal question(s) 60 27.4 42 25.5 
Civil opinions resolving only  
constitutional federal question(s) 142 64.8 105 63.6 
Civil opinions resolving statutory and 
constitutional federal questions 17 7.8 18 10.9 
This suggests that state court experience—whatever its specific degree—is 
concentrated in constitutional rather than statutory law.100 Yet a fuller pic-
ture of state court experience with federal constitutional law can be had by 
 
100 These results are generally consistent with a small study of federal questions taken 
up in state supreme courts.  See Meador, supra note 82.  In that study, Professor Meador 
surveyed the civil and criminal opinions of seven state supreme courts in 1983 and found 
that well over 90% of the federal questions decided involved questions of constitutional 
rather than statutory law.  Id. at 351.   
JOHN F. PREIS 37
looking at the specific constitutional questions it adjudicates in civil cases, 
which are presented in Table 11 below.    
 
Table 11: Constitutional Federal Questions 
Resolved in State Civil Opinions101 
1991 2001 
Total % Total % 
Total civil constitutional questions 172 100 148 100 
Bill of Attainder 1 0.6 1 0.7 
Confrontation Clause 0 0.0 1 0.7 
Contracts Clause 2 1.2 0 0.0 
Dormant Commerce Clause 2 1.2 2 1.4 
Double Jeopardy 1 0.6 2 1.4 
Eighth Amendment 0 0.0 2 1.4 
Equal Protection 17 9.9 20 13.5 
Ex Post Facto Clause 2 1.2 2 1.4 
First Amendment 17 9.9 15 10.1 
Fourth Amendment 6 3.5 2 1.4 
Full Faith and Credit 3 1.7 1 0.7 
Incrimination Clause 0 0.0 3 2.0 
Indian Commerce Clause 1 0.6 0 0.0 
Interstate Compact Clause 0 0.0 1 0.7 
Presentment Clause 1 0.6 0 0.0 
Procedural Due Process 84 48.8 65 43.9 
Seventh Amendment 5 2.9 0 0.0 
Sixth Amendment 3 1.7 0 0.0 
Substantive Due Process 5 2.9 5 3.4 
Supremacy Clause 10 5.8 14 9.5 
Takings 10 5.8 6 4.1 
Void for Vagueness 2 1.2 6 4.1 
Looking at Table 11, one sees that roughly 75 to 80 percent of the constitu-
tional questions adjudicated in civil cases are confined to just five types of 
questions: equal protection claims, first amendment claims, procedural due 
process claims, supremacy claims and takings claims.  While the courts hear 
few civil cases in other areas, one must be careful not to conclude that they 
 
101 Note that this table presents the number of constitutional federal questions, while 
Tables 7 and 8 presented the number of federal question opinions. Because many cases 
contained more than one constitutional question, the total constitutional federal questions in 
this Table differ from the total opinions containing constitutional federal questions.  
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therefore have little experience in those areas.  Due to state courts’ criminal 
and habeas dockets, they have significant experience—perhaps experience 
even superior to federal courts—with claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth 
and Eighth Amendments.  State courts also likely have additional experi-
ence in due process, equal protection, first amendment and takings claims 
because many states have constitutional provisions on these subjects that 
mirror (or at least are interpreted as mirroring) the federal constitutional 
provisions.102 Thus, the picture that emerges with respect to state courts’ 
experience in the area of constitutional law is this: state courts likely have 
fairly significant experience with federal questions predicated on the Bill of 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, but have much less experience with 
questions predicated on the main body of the constitution or certain 
amendments (such as the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Amendments).  Or, to 
put a bit differently, state courts likely have significant experience adjudi-
cating certain categories of individual rights claims, but very little experi-
ence adjudicating questions of federalism and constitutional structure.  To 
be sure, this generalization does not hold true in all specific instances,103 but 
on the whole, it is more correct than not.     
 A much different picture, however, is painted by state court interpre-
tation of federal statutes.  Unlike the constitutional questions often adjudi-
cated in state court, statutory questions are much more variegated.  More-
over, state courts have no alternate way to develop experience in these areas 
of law, as they do in constitutional cases due to their criminal and habeas 
dockets and analogous state constitutional provisions.  Consider Tables 12 
and 13, below.   
 
Table 12: Statutory Federal Questions 
Resolved in State Civil Opinions in 1991 
Statute Total % 
Total statutory federal questions 83 100 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 16 19.3 
Bankruptcy Act 15 18.1 
Federal Employees Liability Act 4 4.8 
Indian Child Welfare Act 4 4.8 
Farm Credit Act 4 4.8 
Fair Labor Standards Act 3 3.6 
42 U.S.C. § 1985 3 3.6 
102 See generally GARDNER, supra note 38.   
103 For instance, state courts seem to decide more Supremacy Clause issues—which 
are structural issues—than substantive Due Process issues—which concern individual 
rights.   
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Table 12: Statutory Federal Questions 
Resolved in State Civil Opinions in 1991 
42 U.S.C § 1988 3 3.6 
5 U.S.C. § 8336-38 3 3.6 
Social Security Act 2 2.4 
National Labor Relations Act 2 2.4 
Consumer Credit Protection Act 2 2.4 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 2 2.4 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 2 2.4 
ERISA 1 1.2 
Uniformed Serv. Fmr. Spouses Prot. Act 1 1.2 
Labor Management Relations Act 1 1.2 
Truth in Lending Act 1 1.2 
Railway Labor Act 1 1.2 
Patent Jurisdiction 1 1.2 
Clayton Act 1 1.2 
28 U.S.C. § 1447 1 1.2 
30 U.S.C. § 29 1 1.2 
Federal Land Policy Act 1 1.2 
Mineral Lands Leasing Act 1 1.2 
Vocational Rehabilitation Act 1 1.2 
General Allotment Act 1 1.2 
25 U.S.C. § 261-64 1 1.2 
Food Stamp Act 1 1.2 
Fed. Property & Admin. Servs. Act 1 1.2 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act 1 1.2 
Federal Credit Union Act 1 1.2 
Table 13: Statutory Federal Questions 
Resolved in State Civil Opinions in 2001 
Statute Total % 
Total statutory federal questions 63 100 
Indian Child Welfare Act 11 17.5 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 5 7.9 
Bankruptcy Act 5 7.9 
Social Security Act 3 4.8 
Labor Management Relations Act 3 4.8 
Healthcare Quality Improvement Act 3 4.8 
National Labor Relations Act 3 4.8 
ERISA 2 3.2 
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Table 13: Statutory Federal Questions 
Resolved in State Civil Opinions in 2001 
Fair Labor Standards Act 2 3.2 
Federal Arbitration Act 2 3.2 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 2 3.2 
18 U.S.C. § 1151 2 3.2 
Communications Act of 1934 2 3.2 
Title VII 1 1.6 
Americans with Disabilities Act 1 1.6 
Gun Control Act 1 1.6 
ICC Termination Act 1 1.6 
Uniformed Serv. Fmr. Spouses Prot. Act 1 1.6 
Rehabilitation Act 1 1.6 
National Trails System Act 1 1.6 
Columbia River Gorge . . . Mgmt. Plan 1 1.6 
Federal Railroad Safety Act 1 1.6 
28 U.S.C. § 1333 1 1.6 
Food Security Act 1 1.6 
Immigration Reform and Control Act 1 1.6 
Emerg. Medical Trmt. & Active Lab. Act 1 1.6 
Communications Decency Act 1 1.6 
Full Faith & Cred. for Child Supp. Or. Act 1 1.6 
Title VI 1 1.6 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 1 1.6 
10 U.S.C. § 1408 1 1.6 
Unlike the constitutional questions heard in state courts (which were mostly 
confined to five types of claims), federal statutory questions are not concen-
trated in any particular area.  The only questions appearing with any regu-
larity involve § 1983, the Bankruptcy Act and the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA).  The Bankruptcy Act and ICWA cases—which comprise about a 
quarter of the statutory questions—are unimportant for the present analysis, 
however.  Litigants wishing to file for bankruptcy must do so in federal 
court.104 Thus, although state courts may have experience in a particular 
portion of the bankruptcy code,105 that experience is not “available” to a 
 
104 Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings.  28 
U.S.C. § 1334 (2005).   
105 State cases involving the Bankruptcy Act typically involve questions of whether 
state judgments assessing fines against a bankruptcy petition violate the Act’s automatic 
stay on all subsequent actions against the debtor.  See, e.g., Miller v. National Franchise 
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claimant choosing between state and federal court.  Similarly, the ICWA 
regulates child custody disputes involving Native Americans that are filed 
in state courts.106 Thus, this question—though federal in nature—is in prac-
tice an insufficient predicate for federal question jurisdiction.   
 With these cases put aside, one sees that state court experience with 
federal statutes is highly limited.  State courts hear only a scattering of 
claims based on federal legislation.  While approximately 30 different stat-
utes appeared in state opinions in 1991 and 2001 respectively, the number 
of adjudications per statute was little more than token.  Roughly 75 percent 
of the statutes were adjudicated only one or two times in over 15 states.  
And only one statute (42 U.S.C. § 1983) was ever addressed more than 10 
during both 1991 and 1992.107 Thus, state court experience with federal 
legislation appears to be highly limited.   
* * *
In sum, while state courts likely have significant experience adjudi-
cating certain types of federal individual rights claims, they have little ex-
perience on the whole with federal law.  This lack of experience is particu-
larly extreme in the field of federal statutes.  The Article now turns to the 
federal governments sovereignty interests, a portion of which are protected 
by federal question jurisdiction.   
 
B. Sovereignty 
Under the classic conceptions of sovereignty, a sovereign has the 
implicit authority to determine the rules of the territory over which it is sov-
ereign.108 If the sovereign chooses a system of government that relies on 
judicial interpretation of that sovereign’s law, the sovereign has a keen in-
terest in (1) having the opportunity to craft its own law through adjudica-
tion, and (2) appearing as a party before its own courts rather than the courts 
 
Servs. Inc., 807 P.2d 1139 (Ariz. App. 1991) (considering whether automatic stay entered 
by federal bankruptcy court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 prohibits garnishment of debtor’s 
salary).    
106 See 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. (2005). 
107 While the Bankruptcy Act and Indian Child Welfare Act were each adjudicated 
more than ten times on one occasion, as noted above, such statutes are relatively unhelpful 
in assessing state court experience.  See notes 104-106, supra, and accompanying text.   
108 The classic conceptions of sovereignty stem from the writings of Thomas Hobbes 
and John Locke. See Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN L. REV. 2029, 2032-34 
(2003).   
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of some other sovereign.  As explained below, statutory federal question 
jurisdiction serves the first, but not the second, sovereignty interest.109 
Lawmaking Interests. Under the United States Constitution, Con-
gress has the primary authority to make law.  Because the judiciary adheres 
to a principle of stare decisis, however, judicial interpretation of federal 
law—whether by state or federal courts—has the effect of law.  The federal 
government, therefore, has a strong interest in having the opportunity to ad-
judicate questions of federal law.  Without this opportunity, state courts 
would essentially control the meaning of federal law.110 
Using § 1331, litigants file approximately 140,000 federal question 
cases each year.111 Of course, only a portion of these yield judicial opinions 
by district or appellate courts that become positive law,112 but without this 
 
109 England v. La. State Bd. of Med Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1964) (noting 
the state courts’ role as the “final expositors of state law” and the “primacy of the federal 
judiciary in deciding questions of federal law”); Friedman, supra note 3, at 1241 (“A sov-
ereign’s interest in . . . defining the rules that govern [its] society, seeing that those laws 
and rules are obeyed, and punishing those who transgress them . . . is a quintessential as-
pect of sovereignty.”); Martin Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Be-
tween State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and the “Martian Chronicles”, 78 
VA. L. REV. 1769, 1774 (1992) (stating that “it makes practical sense for a sovereign’s 
courts to have primary responsibility for adjudication of that sovereign’s law”); Chemerin-
sky & Kramer, supra note 4, at 80-81 (noting the role of federal courts in serving sover-
eignty interests).      
110 While the federal government would still maintain the ability to review state court 
decisions through the U.S. Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1257, it 
would be virtually impossible for the Supreme Court to meaningfully superintend the 
meaning of federal law on its own.  For discussions of the Supreme Court’s modern docket 
and monitoring abilities, see Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Su-
preme Court's Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 739, 743 (2001) (noting the 
Court’s decrease in docket size from an about 150 cases prior to the 1980s to between 70-
80 currently) and Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-
Five Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1704-13 (2000) (noting the 
plenary discretion afforded to the Supreme Court to decline appellate jurisdiction).  While 
Professor Solimine recently observed that “available evidence seems to indicate that the 
Supreme Court has been able, to a tolerable degree, to carry out the monitoring function [of 
state courts],” such evidence says little about the Supreme Court’s ability to monitory state 
courts in a world without statutory federal question jurisdiction.  Michael E. Solimine, Su-
preme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 
359 (2002).    
111 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Table 4.8: U.S. District Courts, 
Civil Cases Filed by Jurisdiction, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/ 
contents.html (listing number of cases filed under § 1331 for past 6 years, which ranged 
from 138,441 to 165, 241).   
112 According to a study of over 1,600 state and federal cases, only 20 percent re-
mained in the judicial system long enough to be resolved on the merits either by pretrial 
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jurisdictional grant, the federal courts would have only limited opportunities 
to rule on federal questions.113 Thus, § 1331 is the main avenue through 
which the federal government can control the content of its own laws.  This 
is far from shocking, of course, but it is repeatedly ignored in assessing the 
purposes of federal question jurisdiction.114 
Litigant Interests. A different situation is presented, however, with 
the federal government’s interest as a party to litigation.  Under this type of 
sovereignty interest, the federal government has an interest in suing and be-
ing sued in its own courts.  While this is a preeminent interest of a sover-
eign, the question here is whether statutory federal question jurisdiction 
serves this interest.   
 The answer is no.  Several statutes other than 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grant 
the federal courts jurisdiction over cases where the federal government is a 
litigant. For instance 28 U.S.C. § 1345 grants “district courts . . . original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the 
United States, or by any agency or officer thereof authorized to sue by Act 
of Congress.”  Similarly, both § 1346 and 1441(b) guarantee the federal 
government, its agencies and officers access to a federal forum if sued.  Be-
yond jurisdiction in the district courts, litigant interests are broadly pro-
tected by the Court of Federal Claims, which, generally speaking, has juris-
diction over non-tort suits for money damages against the United States 
government.115 In addition to these jurisdictional provisions, numerous 
other statutes guarantee the federal government access to a federal forum.116 
motion or a trial on the merits.  Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement, Shading in 
the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 163 (1986).   
113 Federal courts also have jurisdiction over civil cases where the U.S. government is 
a party.  These cases, however, are much less numerous (approximately 55,000) and are 
typically limited to specific areas of law.  See Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, Table 4.8: U.S. District Courts, Civil Cases Filed by Jurisdiction, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/contents.html.    (listing number of cases filed 
in federal court in which U.S. government was a party).  Moreover, many cases—such as 
those involving the Federal Tort Claims Act—require federal courts to apply state law.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. (2005). 
114 See note 4, supra.
115 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2005). 
116 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1347 (granting district courts jurisdiction over a partition 
action where the United States is a joint tenant); 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (granting district courts 
jurisdiction over cases involving corporations organized under an Act of Congress where 
the United States owns more than half the corporation’s capital stock); 28 U.S.C. § 1355 
(granting district courts jurisdiction to enforce “any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary 
or otherwise, incurred under any Act of Congress”); 28 U.S.C. § 1357 (granting district 
courts jurisdiction for “injury to person or property on account of any act done by him, 
under any Act of Congress, for the protection or collection of revenues, or to enforce the 
right of citizens of the United States to vote in any state”); 28 U.S.C. § 1358 (granting dis-
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Thus, while the federal government clearly has an interest in suing or being 
sued in a federal forum, many statutes other than § 1331 accomplish this 
goal.   
 Still, one could argue that such statutes are duplicative of § 1331 and 
that § 1331 alone could serve this interest.  After all, many federal statutes, 
such and the Civil Rights Act and RICO statute, contain jurisdictional pro-
visions that are duplicative of § 1331.117 Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
clearly held that a case “arises under” federal law for the purposes of Article 
III if the federal government is a party to the action.118 This ignores, how-
ever, that the Court has interpreted § 1331’s “arising under” clause much 
more narrowly than the Article III clause.119 Under this narrower under-
standing, a case whose federal nature stems only from the United States’ 
status as a party would not fall within the “arising under” jurisdiction of § 
1331.120Thus, if statutory federal question jurisdiction were abolished, the 
federal government’s litigant interests would not be harmed at all.     
* * *
As explained above in Part IV, federal question jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 serves two particular purposes.  It provides litigants with ac-
cess to judges likely to be experienced in federal law (particularly in statu-
tory form) and it allows the federal government to control the meaning of 
federal law.  With these two purposes presented, the Article now turns to 
 
trict courts jurisdiction over “all proceedings to condemn real estate for the use of the 
United States or its departments or agencies”); 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (granting district courts 
jurisdiction over “any action in the nature of a mandamus to compel an officer or employee 
of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff”); 28 
U.S.C. § 1444 (permitting the United States to remove a state court foreclosure action to 
federal court).  
117 See note 8, supra (noting redundant jurisdictional statutes)   
118 See Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 811 (1824). 
119 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1983) (“Al-
though the language of § 1331 parallels that of the “Arising Under” clause of Art. III, this 
Court never has held that statutory “arising under” jurisdiction is identical to Art. III “aris-
ing under” jurisdiction.”).  See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, §
5.2 at 266-67 (2003) (addressing the distinction between jurisdiction under Article III and 
under § 1331).  For excellent historical accounts of the statutory grant of jurisdiction see 
James H. Chadbourne & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. 
PA. L. REV. 639 (1942) and Roy Forrester, The Nature of a “Federal Question”, 16 TUL. L. 
REV. 362, 374-77 (1942).   
120 One exception to this would be in the field of government contracts.  In resolving 
contract disputes in which the U.S. government is a party, courts typically apply federal 
common law, which is a sufficient hook for federal question jurisdiction under § 1331.  
See, e.g., Almond v. Capital Props., Inc., 212 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000); Montana v. Abbot 
Labs., 266 F. Supp. 2d 250 (D. Mass. 2003).   
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another purpose that might be attributed to the jurisdictional grant but is 
nonetheless not proven by empirical evidence.   
 
V. A NOTE ON CASELOAD 
It is tempting to think that, in addition to the purposes explained 
above, federal question jurisdiction also shoulders a large caseload burden.  
Without federal question jurisdiction, the argument goes, state courts would 
be besieged by an avalanche of federal claims.  When one looks more 
closely at the data, however, this claim is not borne out.   
 In 2003, 142,591 cases were filed in federal court pursuant to federal 
question jurisdiction.121 In that same year, litigants filed 100.1 million 
cases in state courts.122 If federal question jurisdiction were abolished and 
the state courts had to absorb 142,591 federal question cases, the caseload 
of the state courts would increase only a tiny 0.14%.  Yet, it is likely im-
proper to use the states’ total caseload, since it undoubtedly includes many 
small cases such as traffic court cases and small claims court cases, which 
require significantly fewer judicial resources to adjudicate.  To better assess 
the marginal burden that federal question cases would impose, one must 
consider the specific types of cases adjudicated in state courts.  These are 
listed in Table 14, below.   
 
Table 14: Total Incoming Cases in  
State Courts in 2003 (in millions)123 
Case Type Unified & General Jurisdiction Limited Jurisdiction 
Traffic 14.0 40.6 
Criminal 6.2 14.4 
Civil 7.6 9.4 
Domestic 4.1 1.6 
Juvenile 1.4 0.8 
Total 33.3 66.8 
Looking at Table 14, one immediately sees that limited jurisdiction cases 
account for the great majority of state cases.  While these are not always 
 
121 See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, 
Table C-2, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/contents.html.     
122 Richard Y. Schlauffler et al., Examining the Work of State Courts, 2004: A Na-
tional Perspective from the Court Statistics Project, 14 (2005), available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/d_research/CSP/2004_Files/EW2004_Main_Page.html.   
123 Id.
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small in size (a divorce case in a limited jurisdiction family court, for ex-
ample, may require significant court resources to resolve), it is likely that 
most cases in these courts are small.  Similarly, some cases in the courts of 
general or unified jurisdiction—such as traffic cases—do not individually 
impose large burdens the state courts.  A better picture of state caseloads 
(for the purposes of this Article, at least) would include all non-traffic cases 
in courts of unified or general jurisdiction—which number 19.3 million.  
Using that value, an addition of 142,591 federal question cases would only 
increase state caseloads by a negligible 0.7%.   
 Certainly, if faced with the task of absorbing the federal courts’ fed-
eral question docket, state judges and court administrators would claim that 
state courts do not have the capacity to absorb even a 0.7% increase in 
caseload.  This may well be correct, but it does not mean that federal ques-
tion jurisdiction therefore shoulders a huge caseload burden.  It might sug-
gest, however, that federal question jurisdiction therefore provides federal 
claimants with a forum that will review their claims more quickly than al-
ternative fora.  While there is certainly something to this (federal courts do
tend to dispose of cases more quickly than state courts) the difference in 
case processing time is not so substantial that it rises to the level of a spe-
cific purpose accomplished by federal question jurisdiction.124 Moreover, 
even if one recognized this as a limited purpose of the jurisdictional grant, it 
would not be useful in deciding jurisdictional questions.  While different 
cases will implicate experience and control interests to different degrees, all 
cases will implicate the expediency issue to the same degree.  That is, re-
gardless of the subject matter of a case or the federal law involved, federal 
courts assessing their jurisdiction will always be justified in assuming that 
federal adjudication will proceed somewhat more quickly than state courts 
in adjudicating the claim.  Thus, the expediency factor—though perhaps 
enlightening in general—does little to help courts actually determine the 
contours of federal jurisdiction.   
 
124 According to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, federal district courts 
disposed of civil cases, on average, in 8.3 months from time of filing.  See Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Time Intervals 
From Filing to Disposition of Civil Cases Terminated, by District and Method of Disposi-
tion, March 31, 2004, at http:// www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/tables/C05Mar05.pdf.  
According to a study of 36 urban trial courts across the country, state courts disposed of 
civil cases, on average, in 417 days—or 13.9 months—from the time of filing.  See John A. 
Goerdt, Reexamining the Pace of Litigation in 39 Urban Trial Courts, 39, Table 3.2 
(1991), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_CasManReexam 
PaceLitig.pdf.  
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VI. EXPERIENCE AND CONTROL IN PRACTICE 
Replacing the “uniformity-solicitude-experience” regime with an 
“experience-control” regime has important implications for many federal 
question doctrines, particularly those that are explicitly based on the tradi-
tional purposes.125 While the chief purpose of this Article has been simply 
to adduce the empirical evidence on the jurisdictional grant rather than ex-
plore its doctrinal implications, a short exploration of one area of law will 
illustrate the potential import of this evidence.  Thus, this Article briefly 
discusses the doctrines of concurrent jurisdiction, exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion, and exclusive state jurisdiction.     
Under the Supreme Court’s view, “nothing in the concept of our 
federal system prevents state courts from enforcing rights created by federal 
law.”126 Thus, there is a “deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent 
state court jurisdiction.”127 This presumption, however, has been criticized 
as contradicting the traditional purposes of federal question jurisdiction.  
That is, a presumption of concurrent jurisdiction causes numerous meaning-
ful federal questions to end up state court, where they will injure the uni-
formity of federal law.128 In light of the evidence presented in this Article, 
however, the criticisms are misplaced and the doctrine is entirely justified.  
State court adjudications of federal law have little effect on its uniformity 
 
125 Other than concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction, which are discussed in this part, 
the shift in purposes identified in this Article will certainly be relevant to three particular 
subjects in federal jurisdiction: the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal jurisdiction under 
counterclaims, and substantial federal question jurisdiction.  Each of these subjects has 
been debated in terms of the traditional purposes of federal question jurisdiction and the 
new purposes identified in this Article offer a new perspective on the debate.  See Doern-
berg, supra note 12 (claiming that the well-pleaded complaint rule contradicts the tradi-
tional purposes of the federal question jurisdiction); Larry D. Thompson, Adrift On a Sea of 
Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the 
Federal Circuit, 92 GEO L.J 523 (2004) (arguing that has the Supreme Court decision 
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc, 535 U.S. 826 (2002), which 
held that counterclaims containing a federal question cannot provide a basis for federal 
question jurisdiction, will injure the uniformity of patent law); John F. Preis, Jurisdiction 
and Discretion in Hybrid Law Cases, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2006) (using the 
traditional purposes of federal question jurisdiction to assess the appropriate jurisdictional 
rule substantial federal question cases).       
126 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962). 
127 Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990).   
128 See Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 4, at 84.  Other concerns, such as with 
state hostility or experience in federal law are not implicated by concurrent jurisdiction 
because, if the case contains a substantial federal question, either party may choose to have 
the case heard in federal court.  The plaintiff may file the case their in the first instance or 
the defendant may remove it there.  28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2005). 
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because legal questions are extremely close-ended, state courts typically 
follow narrow paths which tend to adhere to federal precedent, and state 
opinions that depart from settled views are highly unlikely to have signifi-
cant precedential effect.  Thus, contrary to views of many, concurrent juris-
diction is entirely unproblematic in the field of federal jurisdiction. 
Of course, although federal jurisdiction is presumed to be concurrent 
with the states, exclusive federal jurisdiction is warranted if the presumption 
is rebutted.  Under Supreme Court precedent, one may rebut the presump-
tion by showing “an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implica-
tion from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-
court jurisdiction and federal interests.”129 The first two grounds for rebut-
ting the presumption in favor of concurrent jurisdiction are tied to Con-
gress’ prerogative to make federal jurisdiction exclusive while the third is 
tied to the judiciary’s prerogative.130 Regardless of who decides whether 
federal jurisdiction over a particular subject matter should be exclusive, 
however, the ultimate inquiry appears the same.  Exclusive jurisdiction is 
warranted by “the desirability of uniform interpretation [of federal law], the 
expertise of federal judges in federal law, and the assumed greater hospital-
ity of federal courts to peculiarly federal claims.’”131 In light of the princi-
ples upon which exclusive federal question jurisdiction has thus far been 
based, as well as the new principles identified in this Article, the question 
becomes: which grants of exclusive jurisdiction are justified and which ar-
eas of concurrent jurisdiction deserve to exclusive jurisdictional status?   
Currently, several types of legal questions are heard only within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts: admiralty,132 patent and copy-
right,133 bankruptcy,134 antitrust,135 and federally-regulated securities,136 
129 Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981). 
130 Of course, it is eminently debatable whether the judiciary has any prerogative at 
all in this respect.  Moreover, in a case decided soon after Tafflin v. Levitt—Yellow Freight 
Systems v. Donnelly, 498 U.S. 820 (1990)—the Supreme Court did not claim authority to 
craft exclusive jurisdiction doctrine on its own.  Instead, it stated the exclusive jurisdiction 
turns solely on whether Congress “affirmatively divest[s] state courts of their presump-
tively concurrent jurisdiction.”  Id. at 823.   Nonetheless, Gulf Offshore and Tafflin, which 
both claim judicial authority to craft jurisdiction under the “clear incompatibility” ap-
proach, are the more commonly cited and accepted authorities on the subject.   
131 Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 464 (citing Gulf Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 483-84).  While the 
quoted factors are from the Supreme Court’s understanding of the “clear incompatibility” 
inquiry, the policy decision undertaken by Congress admits of the same considerations.  
See Redish, supra note 109, at 1811 (noting that “[t]he most striking aspect of [the reasons 
advanced in favor of exclusive federal jurisdiction] is their similarity to the justifications 
generally given for the provision of general federal question jurisdiction in the first place”).   
132 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1) (2005) 
133 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2005). 
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among others.137 Viewed in light of the purposes of federal experience and 
the desire to control the content of federal law, as well as the reality that 
concurrent jurisdiction supplemented by the right of removal138 (rather than 
exclusive state jurisdiction) is the alternative, one sees that exclusive juris-
diction is never warranted.  While federal courts no doubt have superior ex-
perience in these areas (especially because exclusive jurisdiction has di-
vested the states of any experience), concurrent jurisdiction allows either 
party to bring the suit before an experienced federal tribunal.  With respect 
to the federal government’s interest in controlling the content of federal 
law, the evidence reveals that, while litigants may seek state court review of 
scores of different federal statutes, in practice they rarely do.  Thus, opening 
up the state courts to subjects traditionally within the realm of exclusive 
federal jurisdiction is likely to have little effect on federal ability to control 
the meaning of federal law.  
Unlike concurrent or exclusive federal jurisdiction, exclusive state 
jurisdiction over federal law completely divests litigants of any opportunity 
to invoke any experience of a federal judge as well as divests the lower fed-
eral courts of any opportunity ability to control the content federal law.139 
Without concurrent jurisdiction, removal is impossible and thus will not 
preserve litigant interests in these circumstances.  Yet, on the whole, exclu-
sive state jurisdiction is not troublesome.  First, given that federal questions 
within the state courts’ exclusive jurisdiction were placed there by Congress 
(rather than the judiciary), it is doubtful that the federal courts have any su-
perior experience to bring to the matter.  Moreover, some federal statutes in 
 
134 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2005) 
135 See, e.g., Miller v. Granados, 529 F.2d 393, 395 (5th Cir. 1976) (concluding that 
federal courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over antitrust suits brought under the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts); Washington v. American League of Pro. Baseball Clubs, 460 
F.2d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 1972) (same); Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 
358, 363 (6th Cir. 1967) (same).   
136 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2005).  
137 Other less prominent areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction include maritime prize 
cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(2); suits against consuls or vice-consuls, 28 U.S.C. § 1351, suits 
for recovery or enforcement of civil fines, penalties or forfeitures under federal statutes, 28 
U.S.C. § 1355; suits seeking review of certain customs decisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1583; quiet 
title actions against the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 2409(a); suits under the Natural Gas Act, 
15 U.S.C. 717u; suits under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270(b); and state suits for viola-
tions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-2(2).    
138 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2005). 
139 Examples of federal laws creating exclusive state court jurisdiction include the 
Indian Child Welfare Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (2005), and the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2005), and 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (2005) (addressing suits 
against the FDIC as a receiver that involve only the rights or obligations of depositors, 
creditors, and stockholders under state law). 
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the state courts exclusive jurisdiction concern subject matters over which 
they have traditionally exercised jurisdiction.140 Second, although exclusive 
state jurisdiction divests the lower federal courts of control over federal law, 
it does not divest the Supreme Court of its appellate jurisdiction over state 
final judgments involving federal law.141 While, as noted above, the Su-
preme Court’s ability to superintend state supreme court decisions is highly 
limited,142 this ability is not so lame that it can not address the relatively few 
federal laws within the state courts exclusive jurisdiction.  Were Congress 
to place more subject matters within this category of jurisdiction, however, 
federal control over federal law might suffer in significant ways.  Were that 
to occur, federal question jurisdiction would be advisable.   
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is customary to conclude articles of this sort with a summary of 
the conclusions presented within it.  As I trust such conclusions have been 
sufficiently explained throughout, I instead close this paper with a short ob-
servation on the continuing need for empirical studies on the federal and 
state courts.  It is somewhat amazing that, in an age when legal research has 
been hugely simplified by computers, so much doctrine in the realm of fed-
eral jurisdiction still rests on untested (albeit sometimes logical) supposi-
tions.  Time and again, the top scholars in this field have recognized that “a 
central task of the law of federal jurisdiction is allocating cases between 
state and federal courts.”143 Yet, to this day, there is surprisingly little evi-
dence on what our allocation doctrines actually accomplish—that is, what 
types of cases actually appear in state and federal courts.  This paper has 
attempted to make a small dent in this paucity of scholarship.  To be sure, 
however, much more needs to be done.  While those in academia are well-
equipped at studying data, they are less able to gather data.  Therefore, pro-
gress in this area will occur only with contributions by other institutions, 
such as the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and the National Cen-
ter for State Courts.  These institutions have contributed mightily thus far, 
but have not always focused on data that has doctrinal relevance.  A new 
focus on this area, as well as increased effort by many academics, will con-
tribute much to the field in the coming years.   
 
140 See Indian Child Welfare Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (granting state courts ex-
clusive jurisdiction over child custody matters involve Native American children).   
141 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2005).   
142 See note 110, supra, and accompanying text.  
143 Friedman, supra note 3, at 1216.   
